Paradise Lost in The Patent Law? Changing Visions of Technology in The Subject Matter Inquiry by Irwin, Dana Remus
Florida Law Review
Volume 60 | Issue 3 Article 5
11-18-2012
Paradise Lost in The Patent Law? Changing Visions
of Technology in The Subject Matter Inquiry
Dana Remus Irwin
dri23@drexel.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr
Part of the Intellectual Property Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Florida Law Review by an
authorized administrator of UF Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact outler@law.ufl.edu.
Recommended Citation
Dana Remus Irwin, Paradise Lost in The Patent Law? Changing Visions of Technology in The Subject Matter Inquiry, 60 Fla. L. Rev. 775
(2008).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol60/iss3/5
* Assistant Professor of Law, Drexel University College of Law. I would like to thank
David Cohen, Roger Dennis, Daniel Filler, Barry Furrow, Alex Geisinger, Greg Mandel, Paul
Remus, Terry Seligmann, and Catherine Struve for helpful comments and insights on earlier drafts,
and Mary Mitchell for excellent research and editing assistance.
775
Florida Law Review
Founded 1948
Formerly
University of Florida Law Review
VOLUM E 60 SEPTEM BER 2008 NUM BER 4
PARADISE LOST IN THE PATENT LAW? CHANGING VISIONS
OF TECHNOLOGY IN THE SUBJECT MATTER INQUIRY
Dana Remus Irwin*
Abstract
In recent decades, the Patent and Trademark Office and the federal
courts have dramatically expanded the scope of patentable subject
matter—the set of inventions eligible for patent protection. Existing
scholarship has taken a narrow view of this expansion. Scholars argue on
efficiency grounds that without more meaningful limits on the scope of
patentable subject matter, future invention will be impeded rather than
encouraged. This Article takes a broader view of the subject matter
inquiry, tracing its historical development and its changing theories of
technology, from the patent system’s inception to the present. This Article
demonstrates that through these theories of technology the subject matter
inquiry has shaped the patent system’s vision of the social role and
meaning of technology, and defined the social good that the patent law
serves. While the early inquiry placed the patent system in the service of
a broad array of social values, the current inquiry places it in the exclusive
service of economic value. This change, in turn, has facilitated the
expansion of patent rights into all aspects of human life. Recognizing the
discontent that this expansion has caused, this Article proposes that we
consider legislative reform of the subject matter inquiry to better align its
theory of technology with that of contemporary society.
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1. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 126 S. Ct. 2921, 2923 (2006)
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
2. See U.S. Patent No. 4,940,658 (filed Nov. 20, 1986). The ’658 patent was issued on July
10, 1990. Id. 
3. See Lab. Corp., 126 S. Ct. at 2923–24 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Claim 13 of the ’658 patent
claimed a method for diagnosing a cobalamin or folate deficiency by “assaying a body fluid for an
elevated level of total homocysteine; and correlating an elevated level of total homocysteine in said
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I.  INTRODUCTION
In the 1980s, three university doctors discovered that heightened blood
levels of a particular amino acid indicate depressed levels of folic acid and
12vitamin B .  In 1986, they applied for a patent on this naturally-occurring1
correlation, claiming it as a two-step method for diagnosing a vitamin B
deficiency in the human body.  The first step entailed measuring a2
patient’s blood levels of the amino acid homocysteine. The second step
entailed drawing the appropriate conclusion: an elevated level indicated a
deficiency, while a normal level did not.3
2
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body fluid with a deficiency of cobalamin or folate.” Id. at 2924. 
4. Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354, 1358 (Fed. Cir.
2004).
5. 546 U.S. 975 (2005); Lab. Corp., 126 S. Ct. at 2922 (Breyer, J., dissenting). For a
description and analysis of the factual and procedural history of the case, see generally Kevin
Emerson Collins, Propertizing Thought, 60 SMU L. REV. 317 (2007); Robert Kent, LabCorp v.
Metabolite: Providently Dismissed, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 253 (2006); Sue Ann Mota, What is
Patentable Subject Matter? The Supreme Court Dismissed LabCorp v. Metabolite Laboratories,
but the Issue is not Going Away, 11 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 181 (2007).
6. Lab. Corp., 126 S. Ct. at 2925 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
7. Id. at 2921 (majority opinion).
8. See, e.g., Daniel T. Marvin, The Supreme Court’s Missed Opportunity to Settle the
Handiwork of Nature Exception to Patentable Subject Matter in Laboratory Corporation of
America v. Metabolite Laboratories, 26 TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 113, 132–33 (2007);
Michael Meehan, The Handiwork of Nature: Patentable Subject Matter and Laboratory
Corporation v. Metabolite Labs, 16 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 311, 340–41 (2006); Mota, supra note
5, at 181–82; John G. New, Patently Wrong: The U.S. Supreme Court Punts in the Case of LabCorp
v. Metabolite, 10 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 147, 172–74 (2007).
9. Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 792 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
35 U.S.C.).
10. Patentable subject matter is the first of four principal patentability requirements set forth
in the Patent Act of 1952, the other three being utility, novelty, and non-obviousness. See 35 U.S.C.
§§ 101–103 (2000).
11. Id. § 101. This statutory definition has remained remarkably consistent for the past two
hundred years. The Patent Act of 1793 defined subject matter as “any new and useful art, machine,
manufacture or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement [thereon].” Patent Act
of 1793, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 318, 319 (repealed 1836). The sole change has been the substitution of
“process” for “art” in the Patent Act of 1952. Legislative history reveals that the intent of the
substitution was to clarify, but not change, the meaning of the provision. See S. REP. NO. 82-1979,
at 5 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2398–99.
Notwithstanding a well-established prohibition on patenting laws of
nature and natural phenomena, the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO)
granted the patent, and the Federal Circuit upheld it.  In 2005, the Supreme4
Court granted a writ of certiorari in Laboratory Corp. of America Holdings
v. Metabolite Laboratories, Inc. (LabCorp)  to determine whether a patent5
can validly “claim a monopoly over a basic scientific relationship,” such
that a doctor would infringe the patent “merely by thinking about the
relationship after looking at a test result.”  In June 2006, the Court6
dismissed certiorari as improvidently granted because the issue had not
been developed below.  The patent therefore stands.7
Scholars and commentators have been virtually unanimous in
concluding that the LabCorp patent is not directed to patentable subject
matter.  Section 101 of the Patent Act of 1952 (the 1952 Act)  defines8 9
patentable subject matter  as “any new and useful process, machine,10
manufacture or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof.”  This provision has been interpreted expansively by Congress11
and the Supreme Court to encompass “‘anything under the sun that is
3
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12. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (quoting S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 5,
reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2399, and H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at 6 (1952)).
13. These exclusions were created by courts early in the history of the patent system but
never codified by statute.
14. See, e.g., Mackay Radio & Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 306 U.S. 86, 94 (1939)
(scientific truth); Risdon Iron & Locomotive Works v. Medart, 158 U.S. 68, 77 (1895) (agencies
of nature); Morley Sewing-Mach. Co. v. Lancaster, 129 U.S. 263, 278 (1889) (principle or
scientific fact); The Tel. Cases, 126 U.S. 1, 532–33 (1888) (law of nature, force of nature, natural
force, natural process); Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707, 721, 728 (1880) (chemical principle,
scientific fact, conceptions of the mind); Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 498,
507 (1874) (an idea of itself); Burr v. Duryee, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 531, 570 (1863) (idea, principle);
O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 131–33 (1853) (Grier, J., dissenting) (principle in natural
philosophy or physical science, known principle, law of nature, power of nature); Le Roy v.
Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 175 (1852) (abstract principle, fundamental truth, original cause,
motive); Wilson v. Simpson, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 109, 113 (1850) (mental processes); Phila. &
Trenton R.R. v. Stimpson, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 448, 462 (1840) (intellectual process or operation).
15. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309 (citing cases). Examples include the law of gravity,
naturally-occurring living organisms, and mathematical equations. Id. at 309–10.
16. See sources cited supra note 8.
17. For a detailed review of this expansion, see Robert Greene Sterne & Lawrence B.
Bugaisky, The Expansion of Statutory Subject Matter Under the 1952 Patent Act, 37 AKRON L.
REV. 217 (2004).
18. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309–10.
19. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 184 (1981).
20. Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1206 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
21. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373–75 (Fed.
Cir. 1998). For a discussion of this case and the patentability of tax strategies, see William A.
Drennan, The Patented Loophole: How Should Congress Respond to This Judicial Invention?, 59
FLA. L. REV. 229, 237–67 (2007).
made by man.’”  Notwithstanding this broad definition, courts have12
consistently excluded certain classes of discoveries from patentability.13
Various labels have been used to describe these exclusions, including
principles, ideas, products of nature, fundamental truths, original causes,
and motives.  Today, the exclusions are articulated as “laws of nature,14
physical phenomena, and abstract ideas.”  Critics of the LabCorp case15
argue that a naturally-occurring relationship between blood levels of an
amino acid and vitamin B is a law of nature or a natural phenomenon and
therefore, does not constitute patentable subject matter.16
LabCorp is only the most recent patentable subject matter case to
attract widespread commentary. In the last three decades, the PTO and the
courts have dramatically expanded the bounds of patentable subject
matter.  Every advance in the expansion—from the patentability of17
microorganisms,  to computer software,  to genetic information,  to18 19 20
business and tax methods —redefined the contours of patentable subject21
matter. Every advance provoked intense criticism from scholars and
commentators, who argued that courts and the PTO had misinterpreted the
4
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22. John R. Thomas, Liberty and Property in the Patent Law, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 569, 570
(2002) [hereinafter Thomas, Liberty and Property]; see also Margo A. Bagley, Patent First, Ask
Questions Later: Morality and Biotechnology in Patent Law, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 469 (2003)
(arguing that judicial misinterpretation of patentable subject matter has led to a problematic “patent
first” approach by U.S. courts); John M. Conley & Roberte Makowski, Back to the Future:
Rethinking the Product of Nature Doctrine as a Barrier to Biotechnology Patents (Part I), 85 J.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 301 (2003) (arguing that misinterpretation of the product of nature
doctrine has led to some improper granting of biotechnology patents); Michael D. Davis, The
Patenting of Products of Nature, 21 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 293 (1995) (questioning the
patentability of products of nature); Linda J. Demaine & Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Reinventing the
Double Helix: A Novel and Nonobvious Reconceptualization of the Biotechnology Patent, 55 STAN.
L. REV. 303 (2002) (arguing that the modern trend of granting genetic patents is legally unfounded);
William A. Drennan, The Patented Loophole: How Should Congress Respond to This Judicial
Invention?, 59 FLA. L. REV. 229, 271–320 (2007) (arguing for a prohibition on tax strategy patents);
Eileen M. Kane, Patent Ineligibility: Maintaining a Scientific Public Domain, 80 ST. JOHN’S L.
REV. 519 (2006) (examining the patentable subject matter doctrine and recommending a
codification of patent inelligibilities); Arti K. Rai, Intellectual Property Rights in Biotechnology:
Addressing New Technology, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 827 (1999) (arguing that the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit should defer more to the PTOs decisions on patentability); Pamela
Samuelson, Benson Revisited: The Case Against Patent Protection for Algorithms and Other
Computer Program-Related Inventions, 39 EMORY L.J. 1025 (1990) (arguing that computer
program algorithms and other program-related inventions are unpatentable subject matter); John
R. Thomas, The Patenting of the Liberal Professions, 40 B.C. L. REV. 1139, 1167, 1175 (1999)
[hereinafter Thomas, Liberal Professions] (arguing for a discrete restrained technological definition
to avoid an expansive interpretation in the patent law). Notwithstanding the dominant scholarly
criticism, some scholars support expansive subject matter standards. See, e.g., Richard S. Gruner,
Intangible Inventions: Patentable Subject Matter for an Information Age, 35 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 355
(2002) (proposing a broad patentable subject matter test); Robert A. Kreiss, Patent Protection for
Computer Programs and Mathematical Algorithms: The Constitutional Limitations on Patentable
Subject Matter, 29 N.M. L. REV. 31 (1999) (arguing for a broader interpretation of the patentability
of mathematical calculations).
23. This interpretation is the dominant approach to the study of the patent law. See, e.g.,
WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW 294–333 (2003); Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law,
89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1642–43 (2003).
24. See, e.g., Kane, supra note 22, at 523, 558; Nari Lee, Patent Eligible Subject Matter
Reconfiguration and the Emergence of Proprietarian Norms—The Patent Eligibility of Business
Methods, 45 IDEA 321, 358 (2005) [hereinafter Lee, Patent Eligible Subject Matter
Reconfiguration]; Peter Yun-hyoung Lee, Inverting the Logic of Scientific Discovery: Applying
Common Law Patentable Subject Matter Doctrine to Constrain Patents on Biotechnology Research
Tools, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 79, 81–82 (2005) [hereinafter Lee, Inverting the Logic]; Meehan,
supra note 8, at 340–41; Mota, supra note 5, at 181–82; see also 1 R. CARL MOY, MOY’S WALKER
patent law by allowing for “limitless subject matter.”  Viewing the task22
of the patent system as creating efficient incentives to maximize
invention,  most scholars advocate more discrete limits on the scope of23
patentable subject matter and greater protection of the exclusions in the
public domain. Otherwise, they argue, the patent system will impede
technological advance by limiting access to the basic tools of invention
and innovation.24
5
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ON PATENTS §§ 5.3–5.5 (4th ed. 2006).
25. “Technology” encompasses a wide spectrum of meanings. Narrow definitions are limited
to products of industrial, mechanical, or engineering processes; broader definitions include all
things created by people to exploit, manage, or manipulate their natural environments, see RUTH
SCHWARTZ COWAN, A SOCIAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN TECHNOLOGY 2 (1997); the broadest
definitions include all human action that seeks to control or transform a natural or social reality,
see Arnold Gehlen, A Philosophical-Anthropological Perspective on Technology, in PHILOSOPHY
OF TECHNOLOGY: THE TECHNOLOGICAL CONDITION 213, 213 (Robert C. Scharff et al. eds., 2003).
Moreover, “technology” changes and expands with time. The technology of the modern era looked
outward, focusing on the mastery and manipulation of nature. Many of today’s technologies are
more inward-looking, focusing on the mastery and manipulation of the self. See Richard M.
Merelman, Technological Cultures and Liberal Democracy in the United States, 25 SCI. TECH. &
HUM. VALUES 167, 178 (2000). The subject matter inquiry negotiates between these varied and
changing meanings and expresses the patent law’s definition of “technology.”
26. Madhavi Sunder has called for intellectual property regimes to account for non-economic
human values. She argues that intellectual property law must recognize that property rights have
social effects, balance incommensurable values, and structure social relations. Madhavi Sunder,
IP3, 59 STAN. L. REV. 257, 260 (2006); see also Anupam Chander & Madhavi Sunder, Is Nozick
Kicking Rawls’s Ass? Intellectual Property and Social Justice, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 563, 574–75
(2007). Within the patent law, the subject matter inquiry is a locus of such value judgments,
expressing the patent system’s vision of technology’s role and meaning in society.
27. Science and Technology Studies (STS) is an umbrella field that encompasses many
methodological approaches to the study of science and technology in society, including historical,
sociological, and philosophical. Sharing the belief that the categories of “science” and “technology”
are socially constructed rather than rationally constituted, STS scholars study the interdependent
relationship between science and technology on the one hand, and society, politics and culture on
the other. See, e.g., Trevor J. Pinch & Wiebe E. Bijker, The Social Construction of Facts and
Artifacts: Or How the Sociology of Science and the Sociology of Technology Might Benefit Each
Other, in THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF TECHNOLOGICAL SYSTEMS 17, 17–19, 21–22 (Wiebe E.
Bijker et al. eds., 1989); Stewart Russell, The Social Construction of Artefacts: A Response to Pinch
and Bijker, 16 SOC. STUD. OF SCI. 331, 331 (1986); Steven Shapin, Here and Everywhere:
Sociology of Scientific Knowledge, 21 ANN. REV. OF SOC. 303 (1995) (providing a history of the
development of the sociology of scientific knowledge).
This Article contends that this dominant understanding of the subject
matter inquiry is incomplete. The inquiry’s role extends far beyond
striking an efficient balance between patent incentives and the public
domain. By determining which technologies may be the subject of a
patent, the inquiry shapes the patent system’s vision of the meaning and
role of technology in society.  In shaping this vision, the inquiry defines25
the social values that the patent system serves.  Accordingly, many actors26
have a stake in the subject matter inquiry—not only inventors, judges, and
legislators—but also every member of society whose life is shaped by
technology.
This Article seeks to restore richness to the subject matter inquiry.
Drawing on scholarship from the interdisciplinary field of Science and
Technology Studies (STS),  it tracks the changing theories and27
understandings of technology that have informed the subject matter
inquiry from the patent system’s inception to the present. The Article then
6
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28. As with all models, the two models used in this Article—the Enlightenment and Modern
visions of technology—simplify and imperfectly capture reality. They are useful, however, in
illustrating a central argument of this Article. The contrast between the two and the historical move
away from the former in favor of the latter demonstrate that the current conception of the subject
matter inquiry is not inevitable.
29. Technological determinism posits that technology is autonomous, possessing an inherent
logic and structure that dictates not only its own future course, but society’s future course as well.
It is “the belief that social progress is driven by technological innovation, which in turn follows an
‘inevitable’ course.” Michael L. Smith, Recourse of Empire: Landscapes of Progress in
Technological America, in DOES TECHNOLOGY DRIVE HISTORY? THE DILEMMA OF
TECHNOLOGICAL DETERMINISM 37, 38 (Merrit Roe Smith et al. eds., 1994); see also JACQUES
ELLUL, THE TECHNOLOGICAL SYSTEM 125–50 (1980); Robert L. Heilbroner, Do Machines Make
History?, 8 TECH. & CULTURE 335, 335 (1967). Technological determinism has been largely
discredited among STS scholars, who recognize the deeply social nature of both science and
technology. See Andrew Feenberg, Subversive Rationalization: Technology, Power and
Democracy, in TECHNOLOGY AND THE POLITICS OF KNOWLEDGE 3, 3–22 (Andrew Feenberg et al.
eds., 1995). However, determinism still holds influence within many areas of popular culture, and,
as this Article demonstrates, within the patent system.
shows how the inquiry’s conceptions of technology defined the purpose
and goals of the patent system as a whole—purposes and goals that have
changed dramatically over time. While the early patent system served a
broad array of human values and promised broadly-defined social
progress, the current system serves economic value and promises
economic growth. This historical perspective is necessary to understand
how the subject matter inquiry acquired its current breadth, and how it can
be reformed in the future.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part II describes the vision of
technology embraced by the subject matter inquiry at the patent system’s
inception and throughout the nineteenth century. Tied to broad notions of
social progress, technology was defined as the means by which humans
controlled and transformed their natural surroundings. By embracing this
Enlightenment vision,  the early subject matter inquiry defined the patent28
system’s goal as promoting social welfare and advancing social progress.
Part III addresses a Modern vision of technology, which grew as the
dominant social paradigm over the course of the nineteenth century but
was not reflected in the subject matter inquiry until the middle of the
twentieth century. Divorced from nature and broader social values, this
view emphasized technology’s ability to create economic wealth. By
embracing this vision, the twentieth century subject matter inquiry shifted
the patent system’s focus from broad Enlightenment notions of social good
toward the narrower goal of economic growth. Moreover, it surrendered
control over the patent law’s definition of technology to economic forces
and embraced a form of technological determinism.29
Part IV critiques the current subject matter inquiry’s definition of the
patent system’s goals in exclusively economic terms. This conception of
7
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30. See EVELYN FOX KELLER, REFLECTIONS ON GENDER AND SCIENCE 36 (1985)
(paraphrasing Francis Bacon). 
31. Of course, this Enlightenment view of progress—a unilinear path of domination over
nature, economic growth, and expansion of knowledge—is not aligned with today’s social norms.
Today, we recognize that material progress does not necessarily lead to an improved way of life,
and increasing knowledge does not necessarily correspond to increased social welfare. See
Margaret Chon, Postmodern “Progress”: Reconsidering the Copyright and Patent Power, 43
DEPAUL L. REV. 97, 124–27 (1993); Patricia Ewick, Postmodern Melancholia, 26 LAW & SOC’Y
REV. 755, 760 (1992).
32. The idea of man the maker or homo faber has long captured scholarly attention. See, e.g.,
HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION , 144–59, 294–313 (1958); COWAN, supra note 25, at
1; KENNETH PAGE OAKLEY, MAN THE TOOL MAKER (5th ed. 1963). 
33. The United States patent system was created under the first patent statute, passed in 1790.
Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109 (repealed 1793).
34. Thomas Jefferson, for example, held Francis Bacon, Isaac Newton, and John Locke in
high regard. He wrote:
The room being hung around with a collection of the portraits of remarkable men,
among them were those of Bacon, Newton and Locke, Hamilton asked me who
they were. I told him they were my trinity of the three greatest men the world had
the inquiry—the culmination of the Modern vision—fails to account for
the full array of human values implicit in technological advance—moral,
social, and political, as well as economic. Discontent with LabCorp and
other recent subject matter cases suggests that excluding these values from
the analysis fails to reflect society’s preferences. Accordingly, this Article
concludes by proposing reform to the subject matter inquiry to better align
its theory of technology with that of contemporary society.
II.  SHAKING NATURE TO HER FOUNDATIONS:  PATENTABLE SUBJECT30
MATTER AND THE ENLIGHTENMENT VISION OF TECHNOLOGY
The subject matter inquiry of the early patent system expressed an
understanding of technology that differs significantly from the
understanding expressed by today’s inquiry. Understanding technology as
the means by which humans controlled their natural surroundings in
furtherance of social progress,  early courts and commentators described31
patentable subject matter as those aspects of nature that had been
sufficiently mastered to justify a property right. By rewarding the mastery
of nature for human benefit and by defining the exclusions as elements of
nature that had not yet been controlled, the patent system structured
patentable subject matter as an expanding phenomenon and the exclusions
as a receding one.
A.  Homo faber:  The Enlightenment Vision32
At the patent system’s creation,  the Founding Fathers’ understandings33
of technology drew deeply from Enlightenment thought.  In this tradition,34
8
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ever produced, naming them.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Dr. Benjamin Rush (Jan. 16, 1811), available at
http://etext.virginia. edu/toc/modeng/public/JefLett.html (follow second “Letter Rush” hyperlink);
see also DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 24 (1989)
(describing the Enlightenment tradition as “readily absorbed . . . by Americans” and noting that
“the founders understood themselves to be participants in the best Enlightenment thought of
Scotland, England, [and] France”).
35. See MAX OELSCHLAEGER, THE IDEA OF WILDERNESS: FROM PREHISTORY TO THE AGE OF
ECOLOGY 68–96 (1991). This path led to increased human achievement and progress. See Carl
Mitcham, Three Ways of Being With Technology, in 3 FROM ARTIFACT TO HABITAT: STUDIES IN
THE CRITICAL ENGAGEMENT OF TECHNOLOGY 31, 41–42 (Gayle L. Ormiston ed. 1990); Alex
Geisinger, Sustainable Development and the Domination of Nature: Spreading the Seed of the
Western Ideology of Nature, 27 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 43, 56, 58 (1999) [hereinafter Geisinger,
Sustainable Development]. Cf. Mario Bunge, Philosophical Inputs and Outputs of Technology, in
THE HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF TECHNOLOGY 262 (George Bugliarello et al. eds., 1979).
36. See Alex Geisinger, Uncovering the Myth of a Jobs/Nature Tradeoff, 51 SYR. L. REV.
115, 123–26, 129–32 (2001); Geisinger, Sustainable Development, supra note 35, at 52–58.
37. Bacon’s science should be distinguished from science as we know it today. In contrast
to the deductive reasoning of the modern scientific method, Bacon advocated an inductive method.
Moreover, in contrast to today’s secular science, Bacon’s science served religious ends. It enabled
man to dominate nature so as to redeem human civilization and return to the state of grace. See
BENJAMIN FARRINGTON, THE PHILOSOPHY OF FRANCIS BACON 28, 93 (1964).
38. I FRANCIS BACON, NOVUM ORGANUM § 129 (1620), reprinted in III THE WORKS OF
FRANCIS BACON at 370–71 (Basil Montagu ed., Phila., Carey & Hart 1844).
39. The new scientist was trained to objectively measure and quantify nature. The new
scientist still worked in the service of God, but did so as an impartial and disinterested observer of
the natural world. See STEVEN SHAPIN, THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION 3, 68 (1996).
40. Id. at 130 (citing Francis Bacon).
41. KELLER, supra note 30, at 36 (quoting Bacon). 
42. See SHAPIN, supra note 39, at 139.
nature was something to be discovered, mastered, and dominated on the
path of progress.  Two intellectual traditions guided the journey along this35
path: the new science announced by Francis Bacon and early liberal
economic thought.36
Francis Bacon espoused faith in the human ability to know nature
through science  and to dominate nature through technology.  Bacon’s37 38
science broke from the natural philosophy of the past and set aside moral
and religious ideas of what the world should be in favor of objective views
of what the world is.  The power of the resulting scientific knowledge, he39
explained, was rooted in its ability “to yield practical outcomes and to
produce the means for technological control of nature.”  In Bacon’s view,40
technologies did not “‘merely exert a gentle guidance over nature’s course;
they have the power to conquer and subdue her, to shake her to her
foundations.’”  Technology could shield society from nature, provide for41
human needs, and restore the dominion over creation that was lost in the
fall from the Garden of Eden.42
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43. See Carl Mitcham, Three Ways of Being-With Technology, in 3 FROM ARTIFACT TO
HABITAT: STUDIES IN THE CRITICAL ENGAGEMENT OF TECHNOLOGY 31, 41 (Gayle L. Ormiston ed.,
1990).
44. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 40 (1690), reprinted in TWO
TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 100, 117 (Ian Shapiro ed.,
2003).
45. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS
28 (Edwin Cannan ed., Random House 1937) (1776).
46. See id. at 32–37.
47. Robert Nelson explains that technology not only promised economic wealth; it promised
a just, peaceful society:
[T]he history of the modern age (dating from the Enlightenment) reveals a widely
held belief that economic progress will solve not only practical but also spiritual
problems of mankind. Material scarcity and the resulting competition for limited
resources have been widely seen as the fundamental cause of human
misbehavior—the real source of human sinfulness. For holders of this conviction,
to solve the economic problem would be, therefore, to solve in large part the
problem of evil.
Early economic thinkers adopted Bacon’s understanding of nature as
something to be mastered for human benefit, but they transformed his
religious view into a secular one.  John Locke explained that by43
harnessing the power of nature, human labor could create value and
promote limitless economic growth:
[I]t is labour indeed that puts the difference of value on
everything . . . . If we will rightly estimate things as they
come to our use, and cast up the several expenses about them,
what in them is purely owing to nature, and what to labour,
we shall find, that in most of them ninety-nine hundredths are
wholly to be put on the account of labour.44
Adam Smith affirmed and strengthened the link between the
transformation of nature and the growth of society. Nature could provide
two forms of value, he explained: “value in use,” which “expresses the
utility of some particular object,” and “value in exchange,” which
expresses “the power of purchasing other goods which the possession of
that object conveys.”  Untouched and unexploited, nature had neither45
utility nor exchange value. Transformed by human labor, however, aspects
of nature acquired one or both types of value. Once imbued with value,
aspects of nature were integrated into civilization.46
Both John Locke and Adam Smith emphasized the promise of material
wealth as an end in itself. Other thinkers in the Enlightenment tradition
emphasized that material wealth, in turn, promised political and social
welfare.  David Hume summarized a widely held belief that “[i]n times47
10
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ROBERT H. NELSON, REACHING FOR HEAVEN ON EARTH: THE THEOLOGICAL MEANING OF
ECONOMICS xxi (1991). 
48. 3 DAVID HUME, Of Refinement in the Arts, in THE PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS 299, 301
(Thomas Hill Green et al. eds., Scientia Verlag Aalen 1992) (1742).
49. DAVID HUME, ENQUIRIES CONCERNING THE HUMAN UNDERSTANDING AND CONCERNING
THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS 183 (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed., 2d ed. 1902) (1777).
50. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
51. See Frank D. Prager, Historic Background and Foundation of American Patent Law, 5
AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 309, 316–18 (1961).
52. See Leo Marx, The Idea of “Technology” and Postmodern Pessimism, in TECHNOLOGY,
PESSIMISM, AND POSTMODERNISM 11, 19 (Yaron Ezrahi et al. eds., 1994).
53. JOSEPH BARNES, TREATISE ON THE JUSTICE, POLICY, AND UTILITY OF ESTABLISHING AN
EFFECTUAL SYSTEM FOR PROMOTING THE PROGRESS OF USEFUL ARTS, BY ASSURING PROPERTY IN
THE PRODUCTS OF GENIUS 9–10 (1792) (emphases omitted), quoted in CARROLL PURSELL, THE
MACHINE IN AMERICA: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF TECHNOLOGY 98 (2d. ed. 2007).
54. THOMAS G. FESSENDEN, AN ESSAY ON THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR NEW INVENTIONS x–xi
(Boston, D. Mallory, & Co. 1810). Fessenden believed that technology set learned men apart from
manual laborers, and Europeans apart from non-Westerners. He explained that while one whose
life is spent repeating manual tasks “‘has no occasion to exert his understanding, or to exercise his
invention in finding out expedients for removing difficulties,’” and “‘becomes as stupid and
ignorant as it is possible for a human creature to become,’” id. at xii (quoting SMITH, supra note
45, at 734), one who is challenged to develop new means of coping and new technologies improves
the human condition, see id. at x–xi. 
when industry and the arts flourish, men are kept in perpetual occupation,
and enjoy, as their reward, the occupation itself, as well as those pleasures
which are the fruit of their labor.”  In a state of widespread material48
abundance, he explained, “every other social virtue would flourish, and
receive tenfold increase.”  49
The Founding Fathers embraced this Enlightenment vision of
technology as an agent of social progress. Their adoption of the Patent
Clause “[t]o promote the Progress of . . . [the] useful Arts”  marked the50
first instance of a modern nation-state tying technology to social
progress.  They saw the products of technology as “instruments of51
political liberation, essential tools for arriving at the ideal goal of progress:
a more just, peaceful, less hierarchical, republican society based on the
consent of the governed.”  A 1792 pamphlet on patents explained that the52
“promotion of science and useful arts” would lead to “the happiness of
men,—the primary, the grand object of their existence.”  An 1810 patent53
treatise similarly explained that technologies would inspire higher levels
of human achievement.  Technology, in short, was viewed as the54
harbinger of social progress.
B.  Naked Ideas and Barren Principles: The Unified Inquiry
At the patent system’s inception and through its early development, the
subject matter inquiry reflected and reinforced the Enlightenment vision
11
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55. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109 (repealed 1793). 
56. Id. § 1. 
57. Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 318, 319 (repealed 1836). 
58. Section 1 of the 1793 Act combined the subject matter and novelty requirements in a
single section, providing patents for “any new and useful art, machine, manufacture or composition
of matter, or any new and useful improvement on any art, machine, manufacture or composition
of matter, not known or used before the application.” Id. Section 6 of the 1836 Act included subject
matter, novelty, utility, definiteness and enablement requirements in a single section, providing
patents for “any new and useful art, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new
and useful improvement on any art, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, not known
or used by others before his or their discovery or invention thereof, and not, at the time of his
application for a patent, in public use or on sale” and requiring that the patentee first “deliver a
written description of his invention or discovery, and of the manner and process of making,
constructing, using, and compounding the same, in such full, clear, and exact terms . . . as to enable
any person skilled in the art or science to which it appertains, or with which it is most nearly
connected, to make, construct, compound, and use the same.” Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 6, 5
Stat. 117, 119 (repealed 1870). Section 24 of the 1870 Act combined subject matter, novelty, and
utility requirements in a single section, providing patents for “any new and useful art, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, not known or
used by others in this county, and not patented, or described in any printed publication . . . and not
in public use or on sale for more than two years.” Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 24, 16 Stat. 198,
201 (repealed 1952).
59. GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL
INVENTIONS § 27 (4th ed. Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 1873).
of technology. The exclusions represented aspects of nature that had not
yet been brought under human control; patentable subject matter
represented aspects of the natural world that had been incorporated into
society. The categories created an oppositional pair: An invention either
remained a part of nature and therefore an unpatentable exclusion, or
qualified as a product of society and became patentable subject matter. 
The first patent statute, the Patent Act of 1790,  described patentable55
subject matter as any “art, manufacture, engine, machine, or device, or any
improvement therein not before known or used” that was “sufficiently
useful and important” and described “clearly, truly and fully.”  The Act56
therefore merged the subject matter requirement with other patentability
requirements in a single statutory section. Starting in 1793 and continuing
until 1952, the categories of patentable subject matter were articulated as
“art, machine, manufacture or composition of matter.”  As in the 179057
Act, the subject matter categories were included in the same statutory
section as other patentability requirements.58
Courts and commentators interpreted these early patent statutes as
creating a unified subject matter inquiry, which incorporated other
patentability requirements. In the most prominent patent treatise of the
nineteenth century, George Curtis explained that distinctions between
different categories of subject matter were “not vitally important.”  An59
alleged invention constituted patentable subject matter regardless of the
12
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60. Id.
61. See id. § 141 (“First, the principle itself must be new in respect to practical
application . . . . Second, the patentee must have invented and described some mode of carrying the
principle into effect. . . . Third, the means described by the patentee must be so described as to
enable competent persons skilled in the art to effect a practical application of the principle, or, in
other words, to work or practise the invention.” (emphasis omitted)).
62. Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018, 1019 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No. 8,568). For a history,
discussion and explanation of the moral utility doctrine, see Bagley, supra note 22, at 489–93.
63. See Lowell, 15 F. Cas. at 1019.
64. Id.
65. See, e.g., Nat’l Automatic Device Co. v. Lloyd, 40 F. 89, 90 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1889)
(invalidating patent on toy horse race course, used for betting); Reliance Novelty Co. v. Dworzek,
80 F. 902, 904 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1897) (invalidating patent on design for cover of a slot machine);
Schultz v. Holtz, 82 F. 448, 449 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1897) (invalidating patent on coin return device
for coin-operated machines, such as slot machines).
66. See, e.g., Mahler v. Animarium Co., 111 F. 530, 532, 537 (8th Cir. 1901) (invalidating
patent for medical device using electricity to cure diseases).
67. See, e.g., Klein v. Russell, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 433, 445, 468 (1873) (affirming jury
instruction that stated that inventions with no honest uses were unpatentable); Fuller v. Berger, 120
specific statutory category “[i]f the thing itself is correctly described, and
it appears to be novel and useful, and unites all the other requisites of the
statute.”  Elsewhere, in addressing the distinction between an60
unpatentable principle (an exclusion) and patentable subject matter, Curtis
listed novelty, utility, and enablement as the “three requisites for a valid
patent that is to comprehend the application of a principle.”  Accordingly,61
although the various requirements—subject matter, novelty, utility,
embodiment, and enablement—can be identified as individual elements of
the analysis, they were typically treated as intertwined aspects of a unified
inquiry under the pre-1952 patent acts.
In addition to being tied to other patentability requirements, patentable
subject matter was bounded by two doctrines, both of which demonstrate
the influence of Enlightenment thought. The first was the moral utility
doctrine. In 1817, Justice Story explicitly authorized courts to consider
social and moral values in determining whether an invention deserved
patent protection.  He defined “useful invention” within the meaning of62
the patent law as an “invention [which is] not frivolous or injurious to the
well-being, good policy, or sound morals of society;” in other words, one
which may be applied to a beneficial use in society.  Examples included63
technologies “to poison people, or to promote debauchery, or to facilitate
private assassination.”  Courts relied on the moral utility doctrine in64
rejecting the patentability of such inventions as gambling machines  and65
dangerous medical devices.  By the end of the nineteenth century, courts66
were interpreting the moral utility doctrine to preclude only patents on
inventions that had no legal or moral application. The courts let stand
those patents that had applications both legal and illegal, moral and
immoral.  Even in this weakened form, the moral utility doctrine limited67
13
Irwin: Paradise Lost in The Patent Law? Changing Visions of Technology i
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2008
788 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60
F. 274, 275 (7th Cir. 1903) (describing the utility requirement as precluding patents for those
inventions “incapable of serving any beneficial end”); Steven Lubar, The Transformation of
Antebellum Patent Law, 32 TECH. & CULTURE 932, 939 (1991) (discussing the weakening of the
moral utility doctrine during the nineteenth century).
68. See, e.g., Scott & Williams, Inc. v. Aristo Hosiery Co., 7 F.2d 1003, 1004–05 (2d Cir.
1925) (invalidating patent for stockings with a false seam, which made the stockings resemble
stockings of a higher quality); Rickard v. Du Bon, 103 F. 868, 872–73 (2d Cir. 1900) (invalidating
patent for a process of spotting tobacco to make less desirable domestic tobacco look like a more
desirable variety). See generally Robert P. Merges, Intellectual Property in Higher Life Forms: The
Patent System and Controversial Technologies, 47 MD. L. REV. 1051, 1062–64 (1988).
69. Exclusions for algorithms and mathematical formulas were developed during the
twentieth century. See, e.g., Don Lee, Inc. v. Walker, 61 F.2d 58, 59, 66 (9th Cir. 1932); In re
Bernhart, 417 F.2d 1395, 1398 (C.C.P.A. 1969). 
70. See, e.g., Parker v. Hulme, 18 F. Cas. 1138, 1141 (C.C.E.D. Penn. 1849) (No. 10,740)
(laws of nature). 
71. See, e.g., Risdon Iron & Locomotive Works v. Medart, 158 U.S. 68, 77 (1895) (agencies
of nature).
72. See, e.g., O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 131–32 (1853) (Grier, J., dissenting)
(power of nature); Foote v. Silsby, 9 F. Cas. 385, 390 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1851) (No. 4,919) (property
of nature).
73. See, e.g., McComb v. Brodie, 15 F. Cas. 1290, 1294 (C.C.D. La. 1872) (No. 8,708)
(principle).
74. See, e.g., Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707, 724 (1880) (scientific fact).
75. See, e.g., Burr v. Duryee, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 531, 570 (1863) (abstraction).
76. See, e.g., Atl. Works v. Brady, 107 U.S. 192, 200 (1882) (ordinarily occuring idea);
McComb, 15 F. Cas. at 1292 (naked idea). “Naked” was used to refer to uncivilized things, for
example, people who were in a state of nature without the benefits of civilization. See, e.g.,
FESSENDEN, supra note 54, at xi (“[T]he want of which [necessaries] would convert the human race
into hordes of wandering, naked, and houseless savages, much more miserable and defenceless than
the brute inhabitants of the wilderness.”). Use of “naked” in describing an exclusion helped the
nineteenth century distinction between unpatentable exclusion and patentable subject matter track
the distinction between things in their natural state and those that had been incorporated within
civilization. See infra text accompanying notes 87–112.
77. See, e.g., Wilson v. Simpson, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 109, 113–14 (1850) (mental processes).
78. See, e.g., Phila. & Trenton R.R. v. Stimpson, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 448, 462 (1840)
(intellectual process or operation).
79. See, e.g., Tilghman, 102 U.S. at 728 (conceptions of the mind).
the scope of patentable subject matter by excluding inventions that would
serve purposes deemed not to be in society’s interest.  Such inventions68
found no place in the Enlightenment conception of technology as a tool of
social progress.
A second limit on the scope of patentable subject matter, which also
reveals the influence of Enlightenment thought, were the judicially-created
exclusions. Until the twentieth century,  these exclusions were commonly69
articulated as laws,  agencies,  powers and properties of nature,70 71 72
principles,  scientific facts,  abstractions,  naked ideas,  mental73 74 75 76
processes,  intellectual processes or operations,  and conceptions of the77 78
mind.  These exclusions addressed two broad categories of subject matter:79
14
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80. Reference here is to the natural world or nature as understood at the patent system’s
inception. This understanding stands in sharp contrast to contemporary conceptions of nature.
Today, nature is recognized as a collective social representation, such that there is no domain of
nature independent and apart from a domain of society. See, e.g., Keith H. Hirokawa, Dealing with
Uncommon Ground: The Place of Legal Constructivism in the Social Construction of Nature, 21
VA. ENVTL. L.J. 387, 388 (2003). 
81. For example, Thomas Jefferson described ideas as “benevolently designed by nature,
when she made them, like fire, expansible over all space, without lessening their density in any
point, and like the air in which we breathe, move, and have our physical being, incapable of
confinement or exclusive appropriation.” Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug.
13, 1813), reprinted in 13 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 326, 334 (Andrew A. Lipscomb
ed., 1905).
82. See, e.g., Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 572–73 (1823). See generally
JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, INTRODUCTION TO PROPERTY § 1.4.2.1 (2d ed. 2005) (discussing
importance of first possession as a normative justification for property rights).
83. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson, supra note 81.
84. For the countervailing view that patent rights were a civil right securing a property right,
see Adam Mossoff, Who Cares What Thomas Jefferson Thought About Patents? Reevaluating the
Patent “Privilege” in Historical Context, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 953, at 953 (2007) (discussing the
connection between social contract theory and the development of patent law).
85. Morton v. N.Y. Eye Infirmary, 17 F. Cas. 879, 882 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1862) (No. 9,865); see
also Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 174–75 (1852) (“A principle, in the abstract, is a
fundamental truth; an original cause; a motive; these cannot be patented, as no one can claim in
either of them an exclusive right.” (emphasis added)); CURTIS, supra note 59, § 159a.
aspects of the natural world  that were merely discovered by an inventor80
but not applied, and un-embodied innovations that remained within an
inventor’s mind. Both categories encompassed things that remained in
their natural state and were not yet subject to human control.81
The original reasoning behind the exclusions was drawn from the law
of real property. At common law, title to land was consummated by
possession, which entailed the exclusion of others.  Effectively, this was82
a control requirement—property rights necessitated control of the land.
This requirement also applies to the creation and enforcement of
intellectual property rights, but is much more difficult to apply in this
context given the nature of ideas. Unlike land, ideas cannot be physically
controlled. Thomas Jefferson explained that ideas were “incapable of
confinement or exclusive appropriation.”  Jefferson believed that this83
quality foreclosed any possibility that intellectual properties could be the
subject of property rights in natural law.  Courts, however, concluded that84
this quality excluded only some discoveries and ideas from property rights.
An 1862 case explained that the discovery of an abstract principle “can not
be the subject of the exclusive control of the patentee, or the patent law,
until it inhabits a body, no more than can [sic] a disembodied spirit be
subjected to the control of human laws.”  In other words, a discovery85
remained in the category of unpatentable exclusion until an inventor
established sufficient control to justify the characterization of patentable
15
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86. Many authorities viewed patents as granting inchoate property rights, not artificial
monopolies. See, e.g., Singer v. Walmsley, 22 F. Cas. 207, 208–09 (C.C. Md. 1860); Thompson
v. Haight, 23 F. Cas. 1040, 1047 (C.C. N.Y. 1826); CURTIS, supra note 59, at 2–3.
87. O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 132 (1853) (Grier, J., dissenting). Grier
acknowledged, however, that an invention could also result from “a happy thought or conception,
without the labor of an experiment.” Id.
88. CURTIS, supra note 59, at xxiii–xxv.
89. Id. at xxiv.
90. Id. § 7.
91. See supra text accompanying note 44.
92. Atl. Works v. Brady, 107 U.S. 192 (1882); see Lyman v. Ladd, 347 F.2d 482, 483 (D.C.
Cir. 1965) (“[N]aked ideas, independent of the means to carry them out, are not patentable.” (citing
Atlantic Works)).
93. Atl. Works, 107 U.S. at 200.
subject matter. Once an inventor established such control, however, the
discovery could, in fact, be the subject of a property right.86
A crucial question in determining whether an inventor had established
the requisite control was whether human labor had taken the idea, law of
nature, or other exclusion out of its natural state and brought it into human
control. Justice Grier explained that often, the relevant labor took the form
of scientific experimentation: It was “wholly empirical; as the discovery
that a certain degree of heat, when applied to the usual processes for curing
India rubber, produced a substance with new and valuable qualities.”  In87
his patent treatise, Curtis characterized the requisite labor as “caus[ing] the
particles of matter existing in the universe to change their former places,
by moving them, by muscular power or some other force.”  The inventor88
could then bring to bear the “vast latent forces in nature, which come to
the aid of man, and enable him to produce effects and results of a wholly
new character, far beyond the mere fact of placing the particles in new
positions.”  Patentable subject matter included “every object upon which89
art or skill can be exercised, so as to afford products fabricated by the hand
of man, or by the labor which he directs.”  Echoing Locke’s labor theory90
of value,  courts and commentators explained that once transformed by91
human labor in a new and useful way, nature became artifice, and
exclusion became patentable subject matter. 
The question of whether human labor had brought an exclusion within
human control addressed the novelty and utility aspects of the early subject
matter inquiry which, as noted, incorporated these other patentability
requirements in creating a unified inquiry. The embodiment aspect of this
unified inquiry similarly exhibited a concern that inventors establish
control over their discoveries. The Supreme Court explained that a pure
discovery, absent tangible application, fell into an exclusion category.  To92
achieve patentable subject matter, the “mental conception” at the base of
a new invention had to take the shape of a mechanical device or process,93
16
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94. Detmold v. Reeves, 7 F. Cas. 547, 549 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1851) (No. 3,831).
95. Morton v. N.Y. Eye Infirmary, 17 F. Cas. 879, 881 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1862) (No. 9,865).
96. See O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 102 (1853) (citing cases “illustrating the
proposition that the rights of the patentee are not restricted to the particular application or
embodiment of his invention, but extend to the exclusion of other like applications”).
97. In Tilghman v. Proctor, a seminal case in the development of the doctrine of process
patents, the Supreme Court held that a patentee was entitled to protection against all uses of a
specified process for separating fatty bodies into fatty acids and glycerine, notwithstanding the fact
that the claimed apparatus for executing the process was not commercially viable. The Court held
that the patent was for a process, and that process patents offer protection against all methods of
carrying out the same process. 102 U.S. 707, 721–22 (1880); accord Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S.
780, 787 (1876); Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 175 (1852). Moreover, under the
doctrine of pioneer patents, a patent could cover a set of potential inventions, represented though
not fully embodied, by a claimed apparatus. See, e.g., Morley Sewing Machine Co. v. Lancaster,
129 U.S. 263, 273 (1889).
98. Curtis explained: 
If the specification discloses, by sufficient and clear directions, some practical
means by which persons of competent skill in the art can apply the principle and
work it, so as to produce the effect contemplated by the patentee, it discloses a
patentable invention, that invention consisting in a machine or other thing
embodying the principle; or, stated in the other way, the patentable invention
consists in the practical application of the principle.
CURTIS, supra note 59, § 136 (explaining the lessons to be gleaned from Neilson v. Harford, (1841)
and “[t]he abstract” had to be “resolved into the concrete.”  A circuit94
court explained in 1862:
It is only where the explorer has gone beyond the mere
domain of discovery, and has laid hold of the new principle,
force, or law, and connected it with some particular medium
or mechanical contrivance by which, or through which, it acts
on the material world, that he can secure the exclusive control
of it under the patent laws. He then controls his discovery
through the means by which he has brought it into practical
action, or their equivalent . . . .  95
Notwithstanding frequent statements to this effect, an invention did not
have to be embodied in a “thing” to constitute patentable subject matter.96
An invention could constitute a process—a set of steps for producing a
certain result. After disclosing one embodiment of a process, a patentee
received protection against all methods of implementing the process to
obtain the claimed result.  Courts did require that the invention be97
represented by a physical embodiment, but this entailed a different type
of analysis. Specifically, whether or not a claimed apparatus suitably
represented a larger class of inventions rested on whether the invention’s
utility was reproducible by others.  If a patentee’s disclosure was98
17
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151 Eng. Rep. 1266).
99. More precisely, an invention was sufficiently embodied to constitute patentable subject
matter if the disclosure was sufficient to enable one “skilled in the art” to reproduce or use it. See,
e.g., Page v. Ferry, 18 F. Cas. 979, 983 (C.C.E.D. Mich. 1857) (No. 10,662).
100. The enablement requirement was described by a circuit court in 1857 as requiring that
the invention “be so described in the specifications, in such clear, full and exact terms, that persons
of competent skill and knowledge, may construct and reproduce the machine, or thing described,
by following the specification, with the aid of drawings.” Id.; see also 2 WILLIAM C. ROBINSON,
THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS §§ 481, 483 (Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 1890).
For a description of the modern enablement requirement, see 2 MOY, supra note 24, § 7.2.
101. 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1853). 
102. 126 U.S. 1 (1888).
103. See Morse, 56 U.S. at 112, 119.
104. Id. at 112.
105. Id. 
106. See id. at 112–13, 119–20.
107. Commentators have noted that it is unclear whether Morse was a case about the subject
matter requirement or the enablement requirement. See, e.g., Vincent Chiappetta, Defining the
Proper Scope of Internet Patents: If We Don’t Know Where We Want to Go, We’re Unlikely to Get
There, 7 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 289, 317 n.147 (2002); A. Samuel Oddi, Regeneration
in American Patent Law: Statutory Subject Matter, 46 IDEA 491, 514 (2006). The core issue was
whether Morse’s eighth claim was directed to an unpatentable force of nature—a subject matter
issue—but the Court’s reasoning rested on its characterization of Morse’s claim as directed to a
“manner and process which he has not described and indeed had not invented, and therefore could
not describe when he obtained his patent”—an enablement issue. Morse, 56 U.S. at 113. This
confusion does not detract from the significance of this case for understanding nineteenth century
patentable subject matter standards. It just shows the extent to which courts approached the
patentability requirements as a unified inquiry.
sufficient to enable others to reproduce or use the invention, the patentee’s
invention was sufficiently embodied to constitute patentable subject
matter.  At base, the embodiment requirement was therefore an99
enablement requirement.100
In O’Reilly v. Morse,  the Supreme Court addressed Samuel Morse’s101
patent for the electromagnetic telegraph.  Morse’s patent contained eight102
claims, the first seven of which were directed to an apparatus that used
electromagnetism to transmit and record characters.  The eighth claim103
was directed to use of an electric current as a “motive power,” in any form,
“however developed[,] for marking or printing intelligible characters” at
a distance.  The Supreme Court upheld the first seven claims, because104
they were “description[s] . . . given of the whole invention and its separate
parts.”  The Court invalidated the eighth claim because it attempted to105
claim an “exclusive right to every improvement where the motive power
is the electric . . . current” and did not entail a transformation of the natural
force that it claimed.  Drawing on enablement concerns,  the Court106 107
characterized the claim as being directed to a “manner and process which
[Morse] ha[d] not described and indeed had not invented, and therefore
18
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108. Morse, 56 U.S. at 113.
109. Id. at 132–33 (Grier, J., dissenting). 
110. 126 U.S. 1 (1888).
111. See id. at 534–35. Many commentators believe that Morse and the Telephone Cases
cannot be distinguished, despite the Court’s attempt in the Telephone Cases to do so.
112. See id. at 534.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 532.
could not describe when he obtained his patent.”  Morse’s eighth claim108
did not demonstrate sufficient control over the natural force it claimed and
did not, therefore, constitute patentable subject matter.
Dissenting, Justice Grier disagreed with the majority’s conclusion,
while sharing the majority’s understanding of technology as the
transformation and control of nature for human purposes:
The mere discovery of a new element, or law, or principle of
nature, without any valuable application of it to the arts, is not
the subject of a patent. But he who takes this new element or
power, as yet useless, from the laboratory of the philosopher,
and makes it the servant of man; who applies it to the
perfecting of a new and useful art, or to the improvement of
one already known, is the benefactor to whom the patent law
tenders its protection.  109
Justice Grier believed Morse had sufficiently controlled electromagnetism
to justify the characterization of patentable subject matter.
Thirty years later, the Court addressed a parallel claim in the Telephone
Cases,  but came to the opposite result. Claiming to follow the Morse110
majority while appearing to adopt the reasoning of the dissent, the Court
concluded that Alexander Graham Bell’s claim to the use of electricity to
transmit sound at a distance did, in fact, constitute patentable subject
matter.  The Court distinguished Morse by noting that while Morse’s111
eighth claim had claimed electromagnetism as an unaltered force of nature,
Bell claimed specific changes to the natural force to achieve a specific
use.  Bell’s claim was not for the use of a current of electricity “in its112
natural state” since it was only with Bell’s changes that the current could
serve as a medium for speech.  Rather, Bell’s “art consist[ed] in [so]113
controlling the force as to make it accomplish the purpose” of transmitting
vocal sounds at a distance.  Bell’s invention brought the force of nature114
within the control of human society and furthered human progress. It was
therefore patentable subject matter.
Notwithstanding that they drew seemingly contradictory conclusions,
both Morse and the Telephone Cases illustrate the unified nature of the
early subject matter inquiry, and its grounding in an Enlightenment vision
19
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115. The extent and pace of the contraction of the exclusions and the expansion of subject
matter depended on courts’ construction of litigated patents. A patent on a particular application
of a principle, such as use of electromagnetism through a telegraph machine, left electromagnetism
as an unapplied principle in the category of exclusion. See O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.)
62, 113 (1853). A patent on all applications of a principle, in contrast, effectively removed that
principle from the category of exclusion. In the Telephone Cases, the Court recognized that it was
potentially granting a patent for all applications of electricity for the purposes of communicating
sound at a distance. Tel. Cases, 126 U.S. at 535 (“It may be that electricity cannot be used at all for
the transmission of speech, except in the way Bell has discovered, and that therefore, practically,
his patent gives him its exclusive use for that purpose . . . .”); see also Neilson v. Harford, (1841)
151 Eng. Rep. 1266, 1274–75 (granting a patent for every application of the principle that hot air
heats a fire more effectively than cold air). Regardless of the extent of the shift, every patent that
implicated a principle of nature diminished the scope of the exclusions, while expanding the scope
of patentable subject matter.
116. Morton v. N.Y. Eye Infirmary, 17 F. Cas. 879, 883 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1862) (No. 9,865).
117. Id. at 884; see also Ex parte Brinkerhoff, 24 Off. Gaz. Pat. Office 349 (Comm’r Pat. Off.
1883), reprinted in 27 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 797, 797–98 (1945) (citing Morton and invalidating a
method for the treatment of hemorrhoids). See generally 1 DONALD CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS
§ 1.03[3] (2007).
of technology. In both cases, the Court drew on other patentability
requirements—novelty, utility, embodiment, and enablement—in
determining whether an asserted invention was patentable subject matter
or an unpatentable exclusion. In both cases, patentable subject matter—the
apparatuses of the telephone and the telegraph—represented human
control over nature. Judicial exclusions in these cases—the forces of
electromagnetism—represented elements of the natural world that had not
yet been removed from their natural state. Under this approach, every
invention was either nature or artifice, unpatentable exclusion or
patentable subject matter. As a result, as more of the natural world came
under human control, the exclusions contracted, patentable subject matter
expanded, and social progress advanced.  115
Equipped with this Enlightenment vision of technology, the early
inquiry rejected the patentability of medical procedures and business
methods, both of which qualify as patentable subject matter today. In
1862, a New York district court invalidated a patent for the administration
of ether for use as an anesthetic, despite its conclusion that this was one of
the “great discoveries of modern times.”  The court explained that to be116
patentable, the idea behind an invention had to “be embodied and set to
work” and “the natural functions of an animal upon which or through
which it may be designed to operate” could not “form any essential parts
of the [invention], however they may illustrate and establish its
usefulness.”  Dependent on the often unpredictable reaction of the117
“natural functions” of patients’ bodies, medical procedures in the
nineteenth century often produced inconsistent results. Unlike inventions
such as the telegraph and telephone, they did not establish sufficient
20
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118. Ex parte Abraham, 1869 Dec. Comm’r Pat. 59, 59 (Comm’r Pat. Off. 1869).
119. In 1908, in Hotel Security Checking Co. v. Lorraine Co., the Second Circuit held a
method of bookkeeping designed to prevent fraud by waiters was not patentable subject matter. 160
F. 467, 468–69 (2d Cir. 1908). This case was thereafter cited for the existence of a business
methods exclusion, despite the fact that it was decided on novelty grounds. In dicta, the court
stated: “A system of transacting business disconnected from the means for carrying out the system
is not [patentable subject matter].” Id. at 469; see also In re Moeser, 27 App. D.C. 307, 310 (D.C.
Cir. 1906) (concluding that a “mere contract” was unpatentable); U.S. Credit Sys. Co. v. Am.
Credit Indem. Co., 53 F. 818, 819 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1893) (concluding that “a method of transacting
common business” was unpatentable). 
120. The patent grant fostered invention and disclosure by assigning potential economic value
to an invention. Such economic value was realized only if consumers were willing to pay monopoly
rents. As a result, although patentable subject matter was defined as any transformation of nature
that was beneficial to society, the system incentivized only a subset of such transformations.
Moreover, during the patent term, the system indirectly discouraged use of inventions for non-
economic purposes. The patent holder realized an invention’s potential value by excluding from
use anyone who did not pay a licensing fee. This requirement precluded use in furtherance of
competing values by anyone other than the owner, without the owner’s permission. A patent holder
could choose to forgo economic value and license an invention in furtherance of a variety of social
purposes, but the system would not reward such a choice. As a result, most patent holders chose
to maximize economic value. This preference was evidenced by a booming market in technology
rights during the middle of the nineteenth century. See Naomi R. Lamoreaux & Kenneth L.
Sokoloff, Market Trade in Patents and the Rise of a Class of Specialized Inventors in the 19th-
Century United States, 91 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 39, 41 (2001).
control over an aspect of nature to justify the characterization as patentable
subject matter.
At the opposite end of the spectrum from innovations that were still
viewed as a part of the natural world were those, such as business
methods, that had no connection to the natural world whatsoever. These
also failed to constitute patentable subject matter under an Enlightenment
vision. An 1869 patent office opinion concluded that business methods did
not constitute patentable subject matter because “[i]t is contrary . . . to the
spirit of the law . . . to grant patents for methods of book-keeping.”  The118
patent office did not articulate its rationale, nor did courts invalidating
business methods patents,  but it was likely based on a vision of119
technology as the physical transformation and control of nature. 
Admittedly, even though the Enlightenment vision of technology was
pushing the early subject matter inquiry to account for all types of social
value, economic value—or the lack thereof—was serving as the patent
system’s incentive mechanism. The patent system incentivized those
transformations of nature, beneficial to society, that could be translated
into monetary value.  Throughout the nineteenth century, however, the120
inquiry’s grounding in the transformation of nature, and its goal of broad
social progress, limited the influence of economic factors. Into the early
twentieth century, an Enlightenment view of technology continued to
animate the subject matter inquiry and to place the patent system as a
21
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121. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (quoting S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 5
(1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2399, and H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at 6 (1952)).
122. PURSELL, supra note 53, at 229 (quoting Edwin E. Slosson, Back to Nature? Never!
Forward to the Machine, INDEP., Jan. 3, 1920, at 37, 37).
123. COWAN, supra note 25, at 302; see also John C. Greene, Science and the Public in the
Age of Jefferson, 49 ISIS 13, 14 (1958).
124. Cowan, supra note 25, at 302.
125. See Edwin Layton, Mirror-Image Twins: The Communities of Science and Technology
whole in the service of a broad array of human values.
              III.  “‘ANYTHING UNDER THE SUN THAT IS MADE BY MAN’”:       121
                   PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER AND THE           
                           MODERN VISION OF TECHNOLOGY                  
Over the course of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the
dominant social paradigm of technology underwent gradual but significant
changes. Even as the subject matter inquiry continued to embrace the
Enlightenment vision of technology, society’s focus shifted away from
concepts of nature and broad social value and toward technology’s
potential to foster economic growth. A new Modern vision emerged,
which posited technology as an assured means to economic growth—so
assured that the technological means were often viewed as ends in
themselves. To the extent technology served broader social values under
this vision, it only did so indirectly, through the creation of economic
value. By the middle of the twentieth century, this Modern vision was
reflected in a changed subject matter inquiry, which focused on
rationalizing and perfecting the processes of invention and innovation in
order to create economic value.
A.  “‘Back to Nature? Never!’”:  The Modern Vision122
Throughout the nineteenth century, two sets of influences gradually
pushed the Enlightenment understanding of technology as an agent of
social progress from the forefront and replaced it with a Modern
understanding of technology as a spur to economic growth. The first set of
influences came from the practices of science and the other from economic
thought.
Traditionally, the enterprises of science and technology had been
pursued by individuals from different segments of society. Science was the
work of a gentlemen class, who learned their methods in formal
educational institutions and viewed their pursuit as a noble one.123
Technology was the work of artisans, who learned their skills from
mentors in guilds, factories, or elsewhere, and practiced their craft to make
a living.  Over the course of the nineteenth century, barriers between the124
two enterprises broke down.  Formal scientific and engineering education125
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in 19th-Century America, 12 TECH. & CULTURE 562 (1971).
126. Between 1790 and 1865, less than a quarter of all patent-holding inventors had any
college education, and less than half had any schooling at all. B. Zorina Khan & Kenneth L.
Sokoloff, “Schemes of Practical Utility”: Entrepreneurship and Innovation Among “Great
Inventors” in the United States, 1790–1865, 53 J. ECON. HIST. 289, 292, 293 tbl.2 (1993). Of
inventors born after 1870, in contrast, 95% had at least some college education. See Lamoreaux &
Sokoloff, supra note 120, at 42, 43 tbl.3. 
127. See Barry Barnes, The Science-Technology Relationship: A Model and a Query, 12 SOC.
STUD. SCI. 166, 166–69 (1982); Lubar, supra note 67, at 957 (discussing the general belief
beginning in the 1840s that technology was based on science).
128. See Layton, supra note 125, at 562; see also Ronald Kline, Construing “Technology” as
“Applied Science”: Public Rhetoric of Scientists and Engineers in the United States, 1880-1945,
86 ISIS 196, 217–20 (1995).
129. Id. 
130. Frank D. Prager, The Changing Views of Justice Story on the Construction of Patents,
4 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 1, 12 (1960).
131. See, e.g., O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 132 (1853) (Grier, J., dissenting) (“In
many cases, [the new application of an element or agent] is the result of numerous experiments; not
the consequence of any reasoning a priori but wholly empirical . . . .”). 
132. See, e.g., The Tel. Cases, 126 U.S. 1, 296 (1888) (statement of Bell’s counsel describing
Bell’s background).
133. Driven by the substitution of steel for iron and coal for petroleum, the phase saw a
dramatic increase in production capacities, international corporatization, and technological
innovation. MICHAEL ADAS, DOMINANCE BY DESIGN 109–13 (2006). Moreover, as the economy
changed, so too did economic thought. Motivated by the success of the natural sciences,
neoclassical economists embraced a scientific approach and theorized that empirical data about
social interactions could be gathered and used to further economic growth. SCOTT GORDON, THE
HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF SOCIAL SCIENCE 151, 562–63 (1991).
became prevalent among inventors.  Scientific methods came to inform126
technological innovations and inventions,  and technological tools and127
applications came to inform scientific research.  By the early twentieth128
century, multiple points of interaction, overlap, and mutual influence
linked the two enterprises.  129
Within the patent law, this merger translated into an increasing
awareness of the influence of science on technological advance. As early
as 1829, Justice Story had urged craftsman to obtain scientific knowledge
and scientists to obtain craft knowledge.  Later in the century, scientific130
training and methods arose as issues in patent litigation with increasing
frequency. Empirical methods were touted as frequently leading to
invention,  and access to scientific knowledge was seen as evidence that131
an inventor could both conceive of an invention and reduce it to
practice.132
As science was altering the means of technological advance, the
economy was altering its ends. By the end of the nineteenth century, a
second phase of the Industrial Revolution had transformed the country’s
social and economic structure.  By the first decade of the twentieth133
century, the value of American manufactures equaled that of Britain,
23
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134. See ADAS, supra note 133, at 112–13.
135. Id. at 113.
136. Technology was viewed as the cause of the nation’s “unprecedented economic growth,”
and “its hard-won dominance in . . . [the] international arena.” See id. 
137. LANGDON WINNER, THE WHALE AND THE REACTOR, A SEARCH FOR LIMITS IN AN AGE
OF HIGH TECHNOLOGY 44–45 (1986) (quoting Denison Olmsted). To some, technology became a
replacement for politics. Howard Scott, the founder of the short-lived technocracy movement,
argued that “[o]nly when that government had collapsed, and another made up of engineers and
other technicians had taken power, would the problem of production and distribution be solved.”
PURSELL, supra note 53, at 252. The technological optimism of the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries did not go unchallenged, however. The nineteenth century romantic movement was
defined in opposition to it, inspiring writers, artists, and intellectuals to express skepticism. Henry
David Thoreau famously characterized new technologies such as the telegraph as “but improved
means to an unimproved end.” HENRY D. THOREAU, WALDEN 52 (J. Lydon Shanley ed., Princeton
Univ. Press 1989) (1854). “We are in great haste to construct a magnetic telegraph from Maine to
Texas;” he explained, “but Maine and Texas, it may be, have nothing important to communicate.”
Id. Such opposing strains of thought did not quell the dominant optimism, however, nor did they
interfere with the embrace of technology as a key tool of progress. See Chon, supra note 31, at
140–41.
138. PURSELL, supra note 53, at 229–30 (quoting Edwin E. Slosson, supra note 122, at 37–39).
139. See Herbert Giersch, The Age of Schumpeter, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 103, 103–05 (1984);
Vernon W. Ruttan, Usher and Schumpeter on Invention, Innovation, and Technological Change,
73 Q.J. ECON. 596, 597 (1959).
140. LEWIS MUMFORD, The Case Against “Modern Architecture,” in THE LEWIS MUMFORD
READER 73, 74–75 (Donald L. Miller ed., Pantheon Books 1986).
141. Lubar, supra note 67, at 932–33; Frank D. Prager, Trends and Developments in American
Germany, and France combined.  Many Americans came to believe that134
the United States was “the most progressive and prosperous society in all
[of] human history.”  Moreover, many came to believe that technological135
advances caused this prosperity.  Technologies were an “undeniable136
blessing,” rendering “‘the conveniences and elegancies of life accessible
to the many instead of the few.’”  In a 1920 magazine article entitled137
“Back to Nature? Never! Forward to the Machine,” Edwin Slosson
explained that man must look to “‘the divinity of machinery . . . for the
salvation of society.’”138
In the 1930s, Joseph Schumpeter captured and formalized this faith in
technology with an economic theory that identified innovation as a crucial
element of growth, and inspired a scholarly movement that modeled
economic development around technological change, invention, and
innovation.  With economic progress the inevitable result of139
technological advance, society focused its resources on accelerating the
pace of technology. Lewis Mumford later criticized the prevalent “belief
in mechanical progress as an end in itself” for assuming that human
improvement would occur “almost automatically” if society simply
devoted all of its energies to science and technology.  Meanwhile, as140
instrumental views of law gained influence, the patent law itself began to
be viewed as a tool of economic progress.  141
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Patent Law from Jefferson to Clifford (1790–1870) (pt. II), 6 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 45, 59 (1962).
With the patent system furthering technology and technology furthering the economy, Americans
began to conceive of the patent grant as an integral part of economic growth. Lubar, supra note 67,
at 942–43.
142. For historical reasons, the sobering realities of industrialization, war, and the atomic
bomb failed to grip the United States with the same salience as they did Europe. See Ronald N.
Giere, Science and Technology Studies: Prospects for an Enlightened Postmodern Synthesis, 18
SCI. TECH. & HUM. VALUES 102, 105 (1993). Whereas Europe engaged in extensive debate about
the desirability of monopoly patent rights during the nineteenth century, leading in some cases to
the total repeal of patent monopolies, the United States did not revisit the existence of a patent
system. See Fritz Machlup & Edith Penrose, The Patent Controversy in the Nineteenth Century, 10
J. ECON. HIST. 1, 3 (1950).
143. This trend was due at least in part to increasing government involvement in the
technological enterprise. World War II caused the government to invest heavily in research and
development efforts in order to spur the development of new and more effective weapons.
CARROLL PURSELL, TECHNOLOGY IN POSTWAR AMERICA: A HISTORY 1–2 (2007). Moreover,
following the war, governmental funding of research and development continued, culminating in
the founding of the National Science Foundation in 1950. Id. at 9–11. 
144. PURSELL, supra note 53, at 272.
145. Walter A. McDougall, Technocracy and Statecraft in the Space Age—Toward the History
of a Saltation, 87 AM. HIST. R. 1010, 1032 (1982) (alterations in original) (quoting ADLAI
STEVENSON, SCIENCE AND SOCIETY: A SYMPOSIUM (1965)). 
Notwithstanding the two world wars, the Depression, and the
development of the atomic bomb,  technological optimism continued to142
inspire technological advancement and economic growth throughout the
middle decades of the twentieth century.  Carroll Pursell characterized143
the three decades following World War II as “that ‘American Century’ of
which some had dreamed.”  Shortly before his death in 1965, Adlai144
Stevenson expressed the dominant technological optimism as follows:
“Science and technology are making the problems of today
irrelevant in the long run, because our economy can grow to
meet each new charge placed upon it. . . . This is the basic
miracle of modern technology. . . . It is a magic wand that
gives us what we desire!”145
By the middle of the twentieth century, technology’s Enlightenment
promise of holistic social progress yielded to a narrower but assured vision
of economic promise. A Modern understanding of technology had become
the dominant social paradigm.
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146. See In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 959 (C.C.P.A. 1979), vacated in part by Diamond v.
Chakrabarty, 444 U.S. 1028 (C.C.P.A.), aff’d, 447 U.S. 303 (1980). Judge Giles Rich used a similar
expression to refer to the new approach to the subject matter inquiry initiated by the Patent Act of
1952. See infra text accompanying notes 198–202.
147. See supra text accompanying notes 131–32.
148. See David Hull, Openness and Secrecy in Science: Their Origins and Limitations, 10 SCI.
TECH. & HUM. VALUES 4, 4 (1985); Ernan McMullin, Openness and Secrecy in Science: Some
Notes on Early History, 10 SCI. TECH. & HUM. VALUES 14, 15–16 (1985).
149. See Hull, supra note 148, at 6.
150. See McMullin, supra note 148, at 15–16.
151. See Hull, supra note 148, at 12. 
B.  The Anatomy of the Patent Act:  The Modern Vision and the146
Changed Inquiry
By the middle of the twentieth century, these shifts in the social views
of technology were reflected in changes to the subject matter inquiry in
three main ways: (1) Science replaced nature as the construct informing
the exclusions, (2) the 1952 Act initiated a new segmented patentability
inquiry, and (3) courts developed a new utilitarian justification for the
exclusions. These three changes illustrate the divorce of technology from
conceptions of nature and the desire to rationalize and perfect the human
processes of invention and innovation. Together, they created a twentieth
century subject matter inquiry that focused on technology as an end in
itself, with the assumption that technological advance would inevitably
spur economic growth.
1.  Understanding the Exclusions as Science
The first manifestation of the Modern vision of technology was the
replacement of nature with science as the construct informing the
exclusions. In the course of the nineteenth century, scientific training and
methods appeared with increasing frequency in litigation involving
patentable subject matter.  Not until the middle of the twentieth century,147
however, did courts, litigants, and commentators begin replacing nature
with science as a central consideration of the subject matter inquiry.
Technology was no longer envisioned as the control and transformation of
the natural world. It was viewed as applied science.
The traditional Western distinction between the enterprises of science
and technology dates back to antiquity.  Science, under this traditional148
Western view, revealed fundamental truths about the natural world.149
Technology, in contrast, employed these truths to manipulate and control
the natural world.  The two enterprises employed different reward150
structures. Science facilitated openness by granting recognition and
prestige to the first to publish new findings.  Technology encouraged151
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152. See McMullin, supra note 148, at 15–16. 
153. 3 CHISUM, supra note 117, § 7.01.
154. By requiring full disclosure of the invention at the time the patent issues, the patent
system ensures that society will have access to information regarding the invention during the
patent term, and full access to the invention when the patent term expires. See CHISUM, supra note
117, § 7.01.
155. The first to publish and disseminate new findings and knowledge receives prestige and
associated benefits. See Lee, Inverting the Logic, supra note 24, at 103–04. Scholars have
questioned this generalization, however, noting that openness is not always incentivized. See, e.g.,
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and the Norms of Science in Biotechnology Research,
97 YALE L.J. 177, 215 (1987).
156. Commentators worry that the imposition of property rights in pure science will impede
the dissemination and exchange of research results. They also worry that fear of infringement
liability will chill research efforts. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science:
Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1017 (1989); Clarisa Long,
Patents and Cumulative Innovation, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 229, 229 (2000).
157. PURSELL, supra note 53, at 220 (quoting Dr. Charles T. Jackson).
158. See supra text accompanying notes 125–29. 
159. See Layton, supra note 125, at 562; see also Barnes, supra note 127, at 168–69;
Emmanuel G. Mesthene, How Technology Will Shape the Future, SCIENCE, July 12, 1968, at 135,
135; Pinch & Bijker, supra note 27, at 17. 
160. Layton, supra note 125, at 567–70.
161. See, e.g., Pinch & Bijker, supra note 27, at 17, 19–21.
secrecy, granting a competitive advantage if competitors were precluded
from use of a new craft or skill.  152
Under this traditional model, the patent incentive was viewed as
necessary to open the closed culture of technological practice. An inventor
was granted a limited monopoly in exchange for full disclosure of the
invention.  Disclosure made the innovation widely available and fostered153
further innovation.  In the culture of science, in contrast, patent154
incentives were viewed as unnecessary and undesirable: Unnecessary
because science’s reward structure already encouraged disclosure,  and155
undesirable because of a perceived dampening effect on scientific
innovation.  Expressing the traditional view, Charles Jackson declared156
in 1851 that “‘no true man of science will ever disgrace himself by asking
for a patent.’”  157
As noted, the two enterprises converged over time, rendering these
distinctions an inaccurate representation of actual practice.  By the end158
of the nineteenth century, the content of basic scientific research was
frequently determined by technological applications, while its direction
and pace were frequently determined by the development of technological
equipment.  Scientific methods and practices, meanwhile, were being159
applied to problems traditionally associated with technology.  Today,160
Science and Technology Studies scholars conclude that clear distinctions
between science and technology are artificial and unhelpful.  As a result,161
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162. See, e.g., BRUNO LATOUR, SCIENCE IN ACTION: HOW TO FOLLOW SCIENTISTS AND
ENGINEERS THROUGH SOCIETY 174–75 (1987). Others recognize the existence of two enterprises,
but remain acutely aware that their boundaries are a matter of social negotiation and construction.
See, e.g., Michael Lynch, Circumscribing Expertise: Membership Categories in Courtroom
Testimony, in STATES OF KNOWLEDGE: THE CO-PRODUCTION OF SCIENCE AND SOCIAL ORDER 161,
164–65 (Sheila Jasanoff ed., 2004).
163. See, e.g., Mackay Radio & Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 306 U.S. 86, 92–94 (1939)
(noting the employment of a mathematical formula to fix the appropriate angle between antenna
wires for a directive antenna system used in radio communication); Halliburton Oil Well
Cementing Co. v. Walker, 146 F.2d 817, 818, 823 (9th Cir. 1944) (measuring the distance between
an oil well head and the surface of subterranean liquid by calculating through acoustics using a
mathematical formula), aff’d, 326 U.S. 696, rev’d, 329 U.S. 1 (1946); Don Lee, Inc. v. Walker, 61
F.2d 58, 58–59 (9th Cir. 1932) (using a mathematical formula as a solution for a method of
counterbalancing engine shafts by calculating weight and position requirements); In re Bolongaro,
62 F.2d 1059, 1059–60 (C.C.P.A. 1933) (using simple mathematical methods to convert
manuscripts to print publications).
164. See infra text accompanying notes 165–82.
165. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948). Specifically, the
combination resulted in a non-inhibitory inoculant—a combination of inoculants, in which the
component inoculants did not cancel each other’s beneficial effects. Id.
166. Kalo Inoculant Co. v. Funk Bros. Seed Co., 161 F.2d 981, 986 (7th Cir. 1947), rev’d, 333
U.S. 127 (1948).
167. Id.
168. Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 130 (“Discovery of the fact that certain strains of each species
of these bacteria can be mixed without harmful effect to the properties of either is a discovery of
their qualities of non-inhibition. It is no more than the discovery of some of the handiwork of nature
and hence is not patentable.”).
169. See Ex parte Scherer, 103 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 107, 110 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1954) (“To the
some scholars rely on the term “technoscience” in referring to both
enterprises.  162
Notwithstanding the traditional distinction’s shortcomings in
describing actual practice, mid-twentieth century courts and commentators
began using the rhetoric of science and technology to describe the
difference between unpatentable exclusion and patentable subject matter.
They created new exclusions to address the science of mathematics  and163
described exclusions as the products of scientific processes.  For164
example, in finding patentable subject matter in a combination of
naturally-occurring bacteria that resulted in a valuable inoculant,  a165
circuit court explained that “[t]his was application of scientific knowledge
to things existing in nature and the utilization of them in a desirable
composite product which had not been previously achieved.”  Because166
the inventor applied scientific knowledge to a useful end, the resulting
inoculant was a technology.  The Supreme Court disagreed, but within167
the same epistemological framework—the inoculant was a pure scientific
discovery and therefore an exclusion.168
Replacing nature with science as the relevant construct facilitated the
PTOs mid-century change in position on medical procedure patents.  As169
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extent that Ex parte Brinkerhoff holds or implies that all medical or surgical methods are
unpatentable subject matter merely because they involve treating the human body, that decision is
expressly overruled.”).
170. See supra text accompanying notes 115–17.
171. Since 1996, medical procedure patents have been unenforceable against medical
practitioners, but they still constitute patentable subject matter. See 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(1) (2000).
Patent holders can pursue remedies against contributory infringers, such as pharmaceutical
companies and medical device manufacturers. See Todd Martin, Patentability of Methods of
Medical Treatment: A Comparative Study, 82 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 381, 404–05
(2000). 
172. See, e.g., Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 593 & n.15 (1978) (noting that a scientific
principle reveals a relationship that always existed, and thus “[t]he rule that the discovery of a law
of nature cannot be patented rests, not on the notion that natural phenomena are not processes, but
rather on the more fundamental understanding that they are not the kind of ‘discoveries’ that the
statute was enacted to protect”).
173. 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
174. Id. at 309 (alteration in original) (quoting Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333
U.S. 127, 130 (1948)).
175. In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 965 (C.C.P.A. 1979), vacated in part by Diamond v.
Chakrabarty, 444 U.S. 1028 (C.C.P.A.), aff’d, 447 U.S. 303 (1980). 
176. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 178, 187 (1981).
177. 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
178. Id. at 593 n.15.
noted, the initial exclusion followed from the critical role nature played in
the utility of medical procedures—their efficacy depended on the reaction
of the human body.  As courts and commentators dropped nature from170
the inquiry and replaced it with science, this problem disappeared. As an
application of scientific knowledge, medical procedures fit easily within
a definition of patentable subject matter as applied science.  171
Since the middle of the century, courts have repeatedly explained that
scientific discovery, absent practical application, constitutes an
unpatentable exclusion.  Applied scientific discovery, however, is172
technological innovation and therefore patentable subject matter. In
Diamond v. Chakrabarty,  the Court explained that “Einstein could not173
patent his celebrated law that E=mc ; nor could Newton have patented the2
law of gravity. Such discoveries are ‘manifestations of . . . nature, free to
all men and reserved exclusively to none.’”  Other examples include the174
Pythagorean theorem  and the Arrhenius equation.  In Parker v.175 176
Flook,  in invalidating a patent claiming a mathematical algorithm, the177
Court reasoned that “[t]he underlying notion is that a scientific principle,
such as that expressed in respondent’s algorithm, reveals a relationship
that has always existed.”  The relationship may have been first178
discovered by the inventor, but it was not applied so as to constitute
patentable subject matter.
Some legal scholars, adopting this judicial narrative, are even more
explicit in describing the exclusions in terms of basic science, and
29
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179. Rebecca Eisenberg, Genetics and the Law: Patenting the Human Genome, 39 EMORY L.J.
721, 722–23 (1990).
180. Kane, supra note 22, at 525.
181. Lee, Inverting the Logic, supra note 24, at 104.
182. Id. at 81.
183. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 307 (1980) (discussing the authority of
Congress to promote progress through patent laws); SHEILA JASANOFF, DESIGNS ON NATURE:
SCIENCE AND DEMOCRACY IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES (2005).
184. See Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 792 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 35 U.S.C.).
185. See supra text accompanying notes 55–61.
patentable subject matter in terms of applied technology. Rebecca
Eisenberg refers to patentable subject matter as being limited to
“inventions in fields of applied technology, as opposed to basic scientific
research.”  Calling for a strengthening of the exclusions to protect the179
open culture of science, Eileen Kane contends that the exclusions’ purpose
is to protect the scientific public domain, so as to ensure that scientific
knowledge and fundamental scientific tools are freely accessible.  Peter180
Lee argues that the exclusions represent the patent law’s means of
“keeping basic tools of science within the public domain and outside the
realm of individual property.”  Lee characterizes judicial reasoning181
regarding the scope of subject matter as espousing the belief that
foundational elements of scientific research should not be subject to
property rights.  182
The replacement of nature with science is a significant shift within the
subject matter inquiry, both rhetorically and analytically. It draws the
inquiry’s attention away from nature and redirects it toward the human
activities and institutions that produce technology. It envisions the
distinction between subject matter and exclusion as that between two
human enterprises—both involved in innovation and invention. Moreover,
by speaking in the seemingly objective language of science and
technology, it allows courts and commentators to obscure implicit value
judgments.  183
2.  The Segmented Approach of the 1952 Act
The second manifestation of the Modern vision of technology within
the subject matter inquiry was the new doctrinal approach initiated by the
1952 Act.  Affirming the shift in focus away from nature and toward184
technology, the 1952 Act redirected the inquiry from the boundary
between exclusion and subject matter (by definition implicating nature)
and toward the statutory categories of patentable subject matter (by
definition implicating the products of human creation).  The Act did not185
address the exclusions—either to codify or to eliminate them.
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186. See Reiner v. I. Leon Co., 285 F.2d 501, 503 (2d Cir. 1960) (“There can be no doubt that
the [Patent] Act of 1952 meant to change the slow but steady drift of judicial decision[s] that had
been hostile to patents . . . .”); see also L. James Harris, Some Aspects of the Underlying Legislative
Intent of the Patent Act of 1952, 23 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 658, 658–62 (1955).
187.  Harris, supra note 186, at 698 (footnotes omitted).
188.  Id. at 660.
189. The Act’s passage is attributed largely to the initial efforts of Judge Giles Rich (at the
time a patent attorney) and the New York Patent Law Association, and to the later efforts of a
coordinating committee of many patent law associations. See George E. Frost, Judge Rich and the
1952 Patent Code—A Retrospective, 76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 343, 356 (1994).
190. See A Bill to Revise and Codify the Laws Relating to Patents and the Patent Office, and
to Enact into Law Title as of the United States Code Entitled “Patents”: Hearings on H.R. 3760
Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 82d Cong. 121 (1951) (statements of
Rep. Bryson and Rep. Willis).
191. See supra text accompanying notes 55–58.
192. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 hist. n. (2000) (“The corresponding section of existing statute is split
into two sections, § 101 relating to the subject matter for which patents may be obtained, and § 102
defining statutory novelty and stating other conditions for patentability.”). For a history of the
patent system leading up to the 1952 Act, see Frank D. Prager, Standards of Patentable Invention
from 1474 to 1952, 20 U. CHI. L. REV. 69 (1952).
193. 35 U.S.C. § 101. The utility and patentable subject matter requirements are both in § 101,
but they were intended and are treated as independent requirements. See S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at
5 (1952) (“Section 101 sets forth the subject matter that can be patented, ‘subject to the conditions
The intent of the 1952 Act was to make the patenting process easier
and more predictable and to curb judicial hostility toward patents.  One186
commentator explained that “the primary purpose of the revision was to
modernize and strengthen the patent laws, to give the patent right
effectiveness, and to make the statute an understandable and well-written
document.”  Moreover:187
The revision of the cumbersome, sometimes inconsistent,
provisions that had become more and more difficult to
understand or justify, particularly in view of the great
advances of the technologies with which they were so
intimately associated, into the compact, simple, definite, and
practical provisions of the Act, arranged and organized into
an efficient working tool, was a matter of prime
importance.  188
The Act’s drafters, most of whom were patent attorneys,  brought their189
scientific worldview to the task of creating a more mechanical,
systematized statute.  In each of the four prior patent acts, the patentable190
subject matter inquiry had been articulated with other patentability
requirements in the same section.  The 1952 Act separated the subject191
matter, novelty, and inventiveness (restated as non-obviousness)
requirements into separate sections.  Section 101 of the Act covers192
subject matter and utility,  § 102 covers novelty,  § 103 covers193 194
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and requirements of this title.’ The conditions under which a patent may be obtained follow, and
section 102 covers the conditions relating to novelty.”).
194. 35 U.S.C. § 102.
195. Id. § 103.
196. Id. § 112.
197. See Frost, supra note 189, at 352; MOY, supra note 24, § 1:23.
198. This approach had been foreshadowed by courts addressing claims covering mental steps
and mathematical formulae. See, e.g., In re Yuan, 188 F.2d 377, 381–82 (C.C.P.A. 1951).
199. See supra note 189.
200. In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 959 (C.C.P.A. 1979), vacated in part by Diamond v.
Chakrabarty, 444 U.S. 1028 (C.C.P.A.), aff’d, 447 U.S. 303 (1980). 
201. Id. at 960.
202. Writing for the majority in In re Bergy, Judge Rich explained that for “nearly 200
years . . . [the Patent Act has] been liberally construed to include the most diverse range imaginable
of unforeseen developments in technology. . . . We believe § 101 and its predecessor statutes were
broadly drawn in general terms to broadly encompass unforeseeable future developments . . . .” Id.
at 973–74 (footnotes omitted); see also A. Samuel Oddi, Assault on the Citadel: Judge Rich and
Computer-Related Inventions, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 1033, 1096 (2002).
203. For a discussion of the insistence of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and the
Federal Circuit on a segmented approach even in the face of Supreme Court resistance, see Sam
S. Han, Analyzing the Patentability of “Intangible” Yet “Physical” Subject Matter, 3 COLUM. SCI.
& TECH. L. REV. 1, 45–52 (2002). 
204. 437 U.S. 584 (1978). 
205. In re Bergy, 596 F.2d at 959. 
non-obviousness,  and § 112 covers enablement and written195
description.  This new structure articulated the inquiry as a number of196
straightforward steps,  which courts could then apply in a disinterested,197
scientific manner.198
Judge Giles Rich, credited as the primary drafter of the 1952 Act,199
offered a particularly telling title for the intended approach in In re Bergy:
“Anatomy of the Patent Statute.”  The relationship between the statute’s200
sections, he said, could be analogized to separate doors to be opened in
succession by separate keys.  The subject matter requirement was the201
first door and was relatively easy to open because subject matter was
meant to be expansive.  Only after opening this door would a court move202
to the latter doors, which entailed more rigorous inquiries.  203
Also in In re Bergy, Judge Rich criticized the Supreme Court’s
approach in Parker v. Flook,  decided earlier the same year, for:204
an unfortunate and apparently unconscious, though clear,
commingling of distinct statutory provisions which are
conceptually unrelated, namely, those pertaining to the
categories of inventions in § 101 which may be patentable
and to the conditions for patentability demanded by the
statute for inventions within the statutory categories . . . .205
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206. 437 U.S. at 594.
207. Id. at 595.
208. Id. at 593 n.15.
209. Id. 
210. In re Bergy, 596 F.2d at 959. 
211. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
212. See id.
213. 447 U.S. 303 (1980). 
214. Id. at 309–10.
215. Id. at 315 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8). Other Supreme Court cases show a
similar awareness of this broader context. See, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S.
470, 480 (1974) (noting that the patent laws were established in the hope that “[t]he productive
effort thereby fostered will have a positive effect on society through the introduction of new
products and processes of manufacture into the economy, and the emanations by way of increased
employment and better lives for our citizens”).
216. 447 U.S. at 316.
217. Id. at 317.
Although it was decided a number of years after the introduction of the
segmented approach, Flook followed the early unified inquiry.  The206
Flook Court explained that when addressing an invention implicating an
exclusion—in the case at hand, an algorithm—a court should treat the
exclusion as a familiar part of the prior art and determine whether the
claims disclosed a novel, inventive concept.  Echoing the novelty207
element of the early unified subject matter inquiry, the Flook Court
explained that algorithms reveal “a relationship that has always existed,”208
while “[p]atentable subject matter must be new (novel); not merely
heretofore unknown.”  To Judge Rich and other advocates of a209
segmented and systematized approach, this “commingling of distinct
statutory provisions” was unacceptable.  Under the 1952 Act, there was210
to be no unified inquiry that drew upon various requirements.  The211
patentability requirements were to be addressed separately.212
When addressing In re Bergy on appeal in Diamond v. Chakrabarty,213
the Supreme Court adopted Judge Rich’s segmented approach and
emphasized the independence of the subject matter requirement.  The214
Court displayed an awareness of the Founding Fathers’ broad
understanding of technology by noting that the categories of patentable
subject matter had been “cast in broad terms” in order to promote “‘the
Progress of Science and the useful Arts’ with all that means for the social
and economic benefits envisioned by Jefferson.”  The Court did not act215
on this broad vision, however. After noting a “gruesome parade of
horribles”  that the infringer predicted would result from genetic research216
patents, the Court declared itself incompetent to engage in technology
assessment: “we are without competence to entertain these
arguments—either to brush them aside as fantasies generated by fear of the
unknown, or to act on them.”  Implicitly rejecting the moral utility217
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218. For a discussion of the moral utility doctrine in the nineteenth century, see supra text
accompanying notes 62–68 and for a discussion of the Federal Circuit’s explicit repudiation of the
doctrine, see infra note 295 and accompanying text. 
219. 447 U.S. at 307 (footnote omitted); id. (“The question before us in this case is a narrow
one of statutory interpretation requiring us to construe 35 U.S.C. § 101 . . . .”).
220. In re Bergy, 563 F.2d 1031, 1035 (1977).
221. 447 U.S. at 310.
222. Id. at 309.
223. 450 U.S. 175 (1981). 
224. Id. at 188.
225. Id. at 188–89 (footnotes omitted).
doctrine,  the Court interpreted its role as the narrow one of applying a218
technical statute and “determin[ing] whether respondent’s micro-organism
constitutes a ‘manufacture’ or ‘composition of matter’ within the meaning
of the statute.”  219
In the Federal Circuit’s opinion in In re Bergy and the Supreme Court’s
opinion in Chakrabarty, human labor, a key element of the early unified
subject matter inquiry, played a role in the analysis. Its role had changed,
however. In the early inquiry, labor had been valued as an indicator of
control over nature. In these cases, labor constituted evidence that the
alleged invention fell within the statutory category of manufacture. In In
re Bergy, Judge Rich explained that a claimed bacterial culture was a
manufacture because it could not be found in nature and had to be
produced by scientists under carefully controlled laboratory conditions.220
On appeal in Chakrabarty, the Court similarly concluded that the oil-
eating bacteria qualified as patentable subject matter because it was “not
nature’s handiwork, but [the inventor’s] own,”  and a “nonnaturally221
occurring manufacture . . . a product of human ingenuity.”  The salient222
inquiry had shifted. The question was no longer whether human labor had
controlled an aspect of nature. It was whether human labor had produced
a manufacture. And the focus was no longer on nature as something that
stood apart from humanity, waiting to be dominated; it was exclusively on
the human realm, and its ability to create and produce.
The next term, in Diamond v. Diehr,  the Court explicitly rejected223
Flook’s method of claim analysis, concluding that it was “inappropriate to
dissect the claims into old and new elements and then to ignore the
presence of the old elements in the analysis.”  In upholding the224
patentability of an algorithm applied in a process for curing rubber, the
Court explained that “[t]he ‘novelty’ of any element or steps in a process,
or even of the process itself, is of no relevance in determining whether the
subject matter of a claim falls within the § 101 categories of possibly
patentable subject matter.”  A claim was directed to patentable subject225
matter if it was directed to an application of a mathematical form or
34
Florida Law Review, Vol. 60, Iss. 3 [2008], Art. 5
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol60/iss3/5
2008] PARADISE LOST IN THE PATENT LAW? 809
226. See id. at 189.
227. Id. at 189–90.
228. In Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 68 (1972), and Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589
(1978), the Court followed the unified approach to the subject matter inquiry, despite the fact that
the cases were litigated a number of years after the introduction of the 1952 Act. The Court
explicitly adopted the segmented approach in Diehr, 450 U.S. at 191–92, and Diamond v.
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980), but some courts’ analyses continue to echo the early
unified inquiry.
229. 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
230. Id. at 1375.
231. Id. (quoting In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).
232. See CURTIS, supra note 59, § 27 (explaining that an alleged invention constituted
patentable subject matter regardless of the specific statutory category “[i]f the thing itself is
correctly described, and it appears to be novel and useful, and unites all the other requisites of the
statute”).
233. 149 F.3d at 1375 (footnote omitted). Interestingly, the patent requirement that the Federal
Circuit collapsed the subject matter requirement into—utility—is the one requirement that remains
in the same statutory section as the subject matter requirement under the 1952 Act. 35 U.S.C. § 101
(2000).
234. Id. at 1373.
235. 500 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
236. Id. at 1348, 1353.
237. Id. at 1353.
algorithm in a structure or process, rather than to the formula or algorithm
itself.  Novelty played no role in the analysis.226 227
Some courts struggled with the new analysis.  In 1998, in State Street228
Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc.,  the Federal Circuit229
discredited the notion of a business methods exclusion and upheld a
business methods patent.  The court equated subject matter with utility,230
explaining that an alleged invention based on an algorithm could only
constitute patentable subject matter if it produced a “‘useful, concrete, and
tangible result.’”  Harkening back to Curtis’s description of the unified231
patentability analysis,  the court explained that a proper analysis “should232
not focus on which of the four categories of subject matter a claim is
directed to . . . but rather on the essential characteristics of the subject
matter, in particular, its practical utility.”  The State Street court did not233
adopt the approach of the early inquiry wholesale, however. While the
early inquiry relied on other patentability requirements in identifying
transformations of nature, State Street focused on the technology itself,
asking whether the result of the algorithm was sufficiently tangible to
constitute patentable subject matter.234
The Federal Circuit recently reaffirmed the segmented approach in In
re Nuijten,  which addressed the patentability of a watermarked signal235
(an electrical signal encoded with additional data).  The court first236
discussed the question of whether the signal was an unpatentable abstract
idea.  Because the signal required a physical form, the court concluded237
35
Irwin: Paradise Lost in The Patent Law? Changing Visions of Technology i
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2008
810 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60
238. Id.
239. Id. The PTO currently follows this line of analysis in evaluating patent applications. In
oral arguments in In re Ferguson, No. 2007-1232 (Fed. Cir. argued Dec. 5, 2007), PTO Solicitor
Raymond Chen’s reasoning about the business method claims at issue, which entailed a method of
marketing software, was summarized as “non-statutory because they [fell] outside the patentable
subject matter categories delineated in Section 101.” See CAFC Considers Business Method
Marketing Claims Under Section 101, AIPLA REPORTS, Dec. 11, 2007, http://www.aipla.org/Temp
late.cfm?template=/ContentManagement/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=16738.
240. 500 F.3d at 1353.
241. See id. (“Our inquiry here, like that of the Board, will consider whether a transitory,
propagating signal is within any of the four statutory categories: process, machine, manufacture,
or composition of matter.”).
242. Id. at 1348.
243. See supra text accompanying notes 82–84.
244. See supra Parts III.A, III.B.
that it was not an abstract idea.  This finding did not resolve the case,238
however. The court proceeded to the bulk of its analysis, which asked
whether the signal fit within any of the four statutory categories of
patentable subject matter: process, machine, manufacture, or composition
of matter.  The court concluded that it did not and invalidated the patent.239
Ultimately, therefore, the court concluded that the watermarked signal was
neither patentable subject matter nor unpatentable exclusion.240
In re Nuijten casts doubt on the approach of State Street and signals a
renewed commitment to a segmented approach. It also offers a useful
illustration of how the new approach functions. The early inquiry asked if
an alleged invention was patentable subject matter or exclusion, such that
the salient question was whether the alleged invention fell within the
category of artifice or of nature. Under the segmented approach, the focus
shifts to the four statutory categories of patentable subject matter. The
salient question becomes whether an alleged invention qualifies as one of
the four types of human creation listed in the statute: process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter.  This framework fractures the241
oppositional pairing between subject matter and exclusion and creates a
new category of innovations—such as the watermarked signal in In re
Nuijten —that are neither subject matter nor exclusion. 242
3.  The Exclusions’ New Rationale
The third manifestation of the Modern vision, initiated later in the
century, was the emergence of a new rationale for the exclusions. As
noted, the exclusions’ original purpose was to withhold property rights
from aspects of nature that had not been sufficiently controlled for human
benefit.  When nature dropped from the analysis in the middle of the243
twentieth century, this purpose no longer offered a convincing justification
for the exclusions.  By the end of the twentieth century, a new rationale244
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245. See, e.g., Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67–68 (1972).
246. 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
247. Id. at 66. 
248. 55 U.S. (1 How.) 156 (1852).
249. 409 U.S. at 67 (quoting LeRoy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (1 How.) 156, 175 (1852)).
250. Id. at 67.
251. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 593 n.15 (1978).
252. Id. at 591 (quoting Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)); see, e.g., Lab. Corp.
of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 126 S. Ct. 2921, 2923 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting);
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 216 n.41 (1981); In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365, 1377 (Fed. Cir.
2007); SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 403 F.3d 1331, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2005);
SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 365 F.3d 1306, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2004), vacated on
reh’g en banc, 403 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2005); In re Trovato, 42 F.3d 1376, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 1994),
withdrawn on reh’g, 60 F.3d 807 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1553 (Fed. Cir.
1994).
253. Howes v. Great Lakes Press Corp., 679 F.2d 1023, 1029 (2d Cir. 1982) (citing Parker v.
Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589 (1978)).
had materialized—namely, that the exclusions offered protection to the
basic tools of invention in the public domain.  Because this new rationale245
aimed to facilitate innovation and invention rather than exclude areas of
nature, it affirmed the Modern inquiry’s focus on perfecting the means of
technological advance. 
In 1972, in Gottschalk v. Benson,  the Supreme Court addressed246
whether a computer algorithm converting decimal numbers to binary
numbers was patentable.  The Court quoted the 1852 case of LeRoy v.247
Tatham  for the proposition that “‘[a] principle, in the abstract, is a248
fundamental truth; an original cause; a motive; these cannot be patented,
as no one can claim in either of them an exclusive right.’”  The249
Gottschalk Court explained this quote by adding, without citation:
“Phenomena of nature, though just discovered, mental processes, and
abstract intellectual concepts are not patentable, as they are the basic tools
of scientific and technological work.”  This dicta marked the Supreme250
Court’s announcement of the exclusions’ new rationale. The exclusions’
function was to free up the tools of scientific and technical research.
Increased access to these tools, in turn, would increase the patent system’s
inventive output. 
Since Gottschalk, courts have repeated this rationale: “The underlying
notion is that a scientific principle, such as that expressed in respondent’s
algorithm, reveals a relationship that has always existed”  and is “one of251
the ‘basic tools of scientific and technological work.’”  “[S]cientific252
truth, mathematical formulas, phenomena of nature and abstract
intellectual concepts are not patentable because, as basic tools of research,
no one may claim an exclusive right in them.”  Dissenting from the253
dismissal of certiorari in Laboratory Corp. of America Holdings v.
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254. 126 S. Ct. 2921 (2006).
255. Id. at 2923 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also id. at 2922 (“[T]he reason for the exclusion
is that sometimes too much patent protection can impede rather than ‘promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts,’ the constitutional objective of patent and copyright protection.” (quoting
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8)). Moreover, in the first paragraphs of his opinion, Justice Breyer noted
that “those who engage in medical research,” among others, would benefit from the Court’s
“authoritative answer,” id., implying a concern that without a decision, future research would be
hindered. 
256. This view resonates with the dominant scholarly understanding and critique of the subject
matter inquiry discussed in the introduction. See supra notes 22–24 and accompanying text.
Scholarship that picks up on this concern is not incorrect to do so, it is just incomplete if it does not
place it in the larger context of the history and development of the subject matter inquiry.
257. John McDermott uses this term to describe the deterministic position of those whose
answer to the problems of technology was more technology. See PURSELL, supra note 143, at 153.
258. See supra text accompanying note 120.
259. See supra Part II.B.
Metabolite Laboratories, Inc.,  Justice Breyer explained that the254
exclusions are based on the “basic judgment that protection in such cases,
despite its potentially positive incentive effects, would too often severely
interfere with, or discourage, development and further spread of useful
knowledge itself.”  These examples express the fear that if property255
rights were granted in the scientific content of the exclusions,
technological progress would be impeded.  256
Like the segmented approach of the 1952 Act and the replacement of
nature with science within the subject matter inquiry, the exclusions’ new
rationale reflects a Modern understanding of technology as an end in itself.
The exclusions are no longer viewed as aspects of nature undeserving of
property rights because they have not yet been controlled for human
benefit. They are viewed as tools of invention and innovation that should
remain freely accessible in order to maximize technological advance. The
subject matter inquiry’s focus is rationalizing and perfecting the human
activity that produces technology, and under the new rationale, the
exclusions are understood to help in this task.
C.  Laissez Innover:  Technological Determinism 257
and the Current Inquiry
Economic value has always occupied a privileged position within the
patent system.  The patent incentive mechanism works by assigning258
potential monetary value to an invention, which is realized only if
consumers are willing to pay licensing fees. Notwithstanding this
privileged position, the Enlightenment vision of technology limited the
influence of economic factors in the early inquiry.  Specifically, the259
Enlightenment vision anchored conceptions of technology in the control
and transformation of nature, a framework that limited the reach of the
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260. See supra text accompanying notes 116–19.
261. Under the moral utility doctrine, courts and the PTO rejected inventions, which although
marketable and useful, did not serve purposes in society’s moral interests. See supra text
accompanying notes 62–68.
262. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187 (1981).
263. See, e.g., State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1375
(Fed. Cir. 1998).
264. See, e.g., Establishing and Managing Grantor Retained Annuity Trusts Funded by
Nonqualified Stock Options, U.S. Patent No. 6,567,790 (filed Dec. 1, 1999) (issued May 20, 2003);
see also Background and Issues Relating to the Patenting of Tax Advice: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on the Select Revenue Measures of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 109th Cong. 19
(2006) (document prepared by the Joint Comm. on Taxation), available at
http://www.house.gov/jct/x-31-06.pdf; Brant J. Hellwig, Questioning the Wisdom of Patent
Protection for Tax Planning, 26 VA. TAX REV. 1005, 1005–06 (2007).
265. See, e.g., Method for Providing Property Rights Based Guarantees, U.S. Patent No.
7,158,949 (filed Dec. 17, 2004) (issued Jan. 2, 2007); Systems and Methods for Making Jury
Selection Determinations, U.S. Patent No. 6,607,389 (filed Dec. 3, 2001) (issued Aug. 19, 2003);
see also Helen Gunnarsson, Can Lawyers Patent Their Legal Techniques?, 95 ILL. B.J. 344, 344
(2007). 
266. 447 U.S. 303 (1980). 
267. See, e.g., Isolated and Purified DNA Molecule and Protein for the Degradation of
Triazine Compounds, U.S. Patent No. 6,284,522 (filed Oct. 23, 1995) (issued Sept. 4, 2001); DNA
Sequences Encoding the Osteoinductive Proteins, U.S. Patent No. 5,166,058 (filed Jul. 11, 1989)
(issued Nov. 24, 1992).
patent system. And, it defined technology as a tool to achieve political260
and social well-being, which permitted consideration of non-economic
values.  261
By the end of the twentieth century, these limits had disappeared and
the Modern vision had inspired a subject matter inquiry that focused on
technology as an end in itself, without reference to nature or social
progress. This situation is illustrated by current categories of subject
matter, which exhibit little connection to an understanding of technology
as that which transforms nature for social benefit. Some categories seem
entirely disconnected from the natural world, while others seem to remain
unchanged in their natural state. The patentability of computer software
marked a milestone in the expansion of patentable subject matter,  and262
has been followed by the patentability of business methods,  tax263
methods,  and legal methods.  These technologies predominantly264 265
control social relations and have no effect on the natural environment.
Meanwhile, after the Supreme Court’s decision in Chakrabarty,  the266
Patent and Trademark Office began issuing patents on a variety of
biotechnology products and processes, including isolated and purified
DNA sequences.  Many of these technologies, which exist in the natural267
world independent of human creation, appear to be purely natural. Patents
for genes of unknown function offer a particularly clear repudiation of the
Enlightenment vision. It is difficult to characterize an aspect of nature with
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268. See Bryan J. Boyle, Comment, Fishing for Utility with Expressed Sequence after In re
Fisher, 23 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 589, 590 (2007) (questioning whether
partial gene sequences of unknown function continue to constitute patentable subject matter after
In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
269. In analyzing business methods patents in the United States, the European Union and
Japan, Nari Lee speculates: If patent law is there simply to protect any kind of commercial value-
creating action, and if the subject matter of patent law should be any intangible idea or human
activity that creates commercial value and is repeatable by another person, then a business method
patent may not be much of a problem. Lee, Patent Eligible Subject Matter Reconfiguration, supra
note 24, at 326. What Lee fails to recognize is that this hypothetical precisely captures the current
state of subject matter standards in the United States.
270. See Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 126 S. Ct. 2921, 2923 (2006)
(Breyer, J., dissenting). 
271. Method of Putting, U.S. Patent No. 5,616,089 (filed Mar. 29, 1996) (issued Apr. 1, 1997).
Other sport-related patents include a method for fitness training, Fitness Method, U.S. Patent No.
6,190,291 (filed June 26, 1997) (issued Feb. 20, 2001); a method for training baseball pitchers,
Training Apparatus, Method for Training an Athlete, and Method for Producing a Training Device,
U.S. Patent No. 5,639,243 (filed Apr. 26, 1995) (issued Jun. 17, 1997); and a method for training
swings, Method of Swing Training for Sports, U.S. Patent No. 6,176,790 (filed Nov. 23, 1998)
(issued Jan. 23, 2001).
272. Establishing and Managing Grantor Retained Annuity Trusts Funded by Nonqualified
Stock Options, U.S. Patent No. 6,567,790 (filed Dec. 1, 1999) (issued May 20, 2003).
an unknown function as having been controlled for human benefit.268
Without the Enlightenment constraints of nature and broad social value,
economic value was granted an almost exclusive role in defining the patent
system’s vision of technology. With the Modern inquiry aiming to
rationalize and maximize the inventive process, and inventors taking
advantage of a patent system that had shed its Enlightenment limits,
subject matter standards expanded dramatically. Today, the standards
encompass any product of human action that creates economic value.  If269
something has value in use or exchange—a statistical correlation between
a human hormone level and a vitamin deficiency,  a method of swinging270
a golf club,  or a method of reducing tax liability —it now constitutes271 272
patentable subject matter. Through this definition of technology, the
subject matter inquiry no longer conceives of the patent grant as a tool of
social progress. Rather, it conceives of it as a tool of economic growth.
The direct social good that the patent system serves is envisioned in
exclusively market-utilitarian terms, and other social values can be served
only indirectly as the result of increased wealth.
The current subject matter inquiry has therefore internalized two
premises of the Modern vision: that technological advance and economic
growth are inextricably linked, and that incentivizing economic growth
will fulfill the patent system’s constitutional role of incentivizing
technological progress. By accepting these premises, the subject matter
inquiry (and through it, the patent system as a whole), assumes that as long
as the patent system incentivizes value creation, it will properly incentivize
40
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273. The Supreme Court has expressed this understanding. In Gottschalk, the Court referred
to “the new, onrushing technology,” Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71 (1972), exhibiting an
understanding of technological advance as autonomous and inevitable. In Chakrabarty, the Court
limited its agency in controlling technology’s path, noting “[t]he large amount of research that has
already occurred when no researcher had sure knowledge that patent protection would be available
suggests that legislative or judicial fiat as to patentability will not deter the scientific mind from
probing into the unknown any more than Canute could command the tides.” Diamond v.
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 317 (1980).
274. State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369, 372 (N.J. 1971).
275. See Howard P. Segal, Technology, Pessimism, and Postmodernism: Introduction, in
TECHNOLOGY, PESSIMISM, AND POSTMODERNISM, supra note 52, at 1. In 1979, New York Times
writer John Noble Wilford reported on a symposium on modern technology: “[A] mood of
pessimism is overtaking and may have already displaced the old optimistic view of history as a
steady and cumulative expansion of human power, the idea of inevitable progress born in the
Scientific and Industrial Revolutions and dominant in the 19th century and for at least the first half
of this century. This pessimism is fed by growing doubts about society’s ability to rein in the
seemingly runaway forces of technology . . . .” Id. (quoting John Noble Wilford, Scholars Confront
the Decline of Technology’s Image, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 1979, at C1).
276. See COWAN, supra note 25, at 326 (“[N]o new technology has ever been the unalloyed
blessing that its advocates say it is—or the unalloyed curse that its opponents insist it is. All
technological changes have unintended and unexpected social and ethical outcomes, few of which
have been predicted by even the best of experts . . . some people will be affected positively and
others negatively by the outcome of any technological change; indeed, the same person can be
affected negatively or positively depending on which of several possible social roles that person
technological advancement. It proceeds on the belief that the patent system
can influence the pace of technological advancement, but not its shape or
direction.  This sense of technological determinism—the culmination of273
the Modern vision of technology within the patent law—may be a
fundamental source of the discontent surrounding new types of patented
technologies. It shows that the subject matter inquiry has surrendered the
patent law’s definition of technology to economic forces. Moreover, it
suggests that unless the subject matter inquiry is deliberately re-crafted,
the patent system will continue to preclude consideration of non-
quantifiable costs, while extending its reach into all corners of human
activity.
IV.  “PROPERTY RIGHTS SERVE HUMAN VALUES”:  RE-CRAFTING274
PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER STANDARDS
In the second half of the twentieth century, society became increasingly
concerned with the risks and harms associated with technology, with the
social good that technology could serve absent monopoly rights, and with
the pervasive creep of technology into formerly sacrosanct areas of life.
The Modern vision of technology lost its stronghold as the dominant social
paradigm.  In many segments of society, it yielded to a Postmodern275
understanding that for every solution technology offers, it poses multiple
new problems.  Technological determinism, meanwhile, was largely276
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happens to be playing.”).
277. See Segal, supra note 275, at 3. STS scholars have shown that technologies are not pre-
programmed with determinate forms, results, and trajectories, nor do they steer society’s course in
an inevitable direction. Rather, technologies are the product of a web of political, cultural, and
social forces. See Feenberg, supra note 29, at 3–18; WINNER, supra note 137, at 19–20, 25, 38.
278. Restricting or precluding a patent would alter incentives, but it would not dictate or
preclude particular forms of conduct. It would not preclude the underlying research or prevent the
invention from being created and used. See Bagley, supra note 22, at 513, 535–36. The Supreme
Court recognized this point in Chakrabarty. 447 U.S. at 317.
279. The costs associated with restricting access to highly beneficial inventions could also be
addressed through limited enforcement. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(1) (2000) (precluding
enforceability of medical procedure patents against medical practitioners). 
280. See Bunge, supra note 35, at 276–77. As commentators have noted, human cloning,
genetically-altered life forms, and nuclear technologies threaten genetic diversity, human health,
and national security, while reproductive technologies, genetically altered food, and psychotropic
medications manipulate human relationships and human nature in new and unpredictable ways. See
Merelman, supra note 25, at 168–69, 177–78; Thomas, Liberty and Property, supra note 22, at 574.
281. See DON IHDE, PHILOSOPHY OF TECHNOLOGY: AN INTRODUCTION 87 (1993). 
282. See ROBERT FRIEDEL, A CULTURE OF IMPROVEMENT: TECHNOLOGY AND THE WESTERN
MILLENIUM 531–37 (2007). The “appropriate technology movement” was based on the premise that
many of the ills technology had created—pollution, increased energy costs, resource
depletion—could be effectively addressed through reliance on only “appropriate” technologies.
Expressing the core sentiment of this movement, the economist E.F. Schumaker argued that
“‘[w]isdom demands a new orientation of science and technology towards the organic, the gentle,
discredited as a theory of technology’s role in society.  Nonetheless, a277
Modern vision of technology continues to animate the patentable subject
matter inquiry. This, in turn, blinds the inquiry to two broad and
problematic categories of invention. The first encompasses inventions that
are so dangerous or morally controversial that it is questionable whether
society should incentivize them.  The second encompasses inventions278
that are so socially beneficial that it is questionable whether any one
individual or group should be granted exclusionary rights in them.  If the279
patent system is to align with social understandings of technology and
serve society effectively, the subject matter inquiry must account for both
problematic categories. To do so, it must shed its sense of determinism and
embrace a more nuanced understanding than is provided by the Modern
vision. Just as the Enlightenment vision of the subject matter inquiry gave
way to the Modern vision, the Modern vision needs to now give way to a
Postmodern vision.
Throughout the twentieth century, society increasingly acknowledged
the risks of technology.  World wars, atomic weapons, and irreversible280
environmental pollution offered vivid illustrations of technology’s
potential for destruction.  During the late 1960s and 1970s, the281
“appropriate technology movement” sparked mainstream criticism of
technology, raising awareness not only of its risks and harms, but also of
its pervasive creep into all aspects of human life.  Even proponents of282
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the non-violent, the elegant and beautiful.’” WINNER, supra note 137, at 62 (quoting E.F.
SCHUMACHER, SMALL IS BEAUTIFUL: ECONOMICS AS IF PEOPLE MATTERED 31 (Harper & Row,
1973)). 
283. PURSELL, supra note 143, at 153; see WINNER, supra note 137, at 5. 
284. See National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2000). 
285. See National Research Act, Title II, PL 93-348, 88 Stat. 342 (1974).
286. See Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act Amendments of 1962, PL 87-781, 76 Stat. 781
(1962).
287. See Office of Technology Assessment Act, PL 92-484, 86 Stat. 797 (1972); see also
Gregory C. Kunkle, New Challenge or Past Revisited? The Office of Technology Assessment in
Historical Context, 17 TECH. IN SOC’Y 175 (1995).
288. One significant exception to this generalization is the statutory ban on patents on nuclear
technologies, which demonstrates that the patent system can react to technology’s dangers if it
chooses to do so. 42 U.S.C. § 2181(a) (exempting from patent protection inventions that are “useful
solely in the utilization of special nuclear material or atomic energy in an atomic weapon”). 
289. See supra note 288.
290. See, e.g., Merges, supra note 68, at 1068; Burton T. Ong, Patenting the Biological Bounty
of Nature: Re-examining the Status of Organic Inventions as Patentable Subject Matter, 8 MARQ.
INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 5–6 (2004); Michael E. Sellers, Patenting Nonnaturally Occurring, Man-
Made Life: A Practical Look at the Economic, Environmental, and Ethical Challenges Facing
“Animal Patents,” 47 ARK. L. REV. 269, 295 (1994); James R. Chiapetta, Comment, Of Mice and
Machine: A Paradigmatic Challenge to Interpretation of the Patent Statute, 20 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 155, 178 (1994).
291. See Ong, supra note 290, at 5–6.
technology acknowledged risks and potential harms. They argued,
however, that solutions could be found in the production of new
technologies.  283
In the second half of the twentieth century, a variety of governmental
entities responded to technology’s risks. The Environmental Protection
Agency required impact statements;  the Department of Health,284
Education and Welfare established a commission to study the implications
of biotechnology research;  the Food and Drug Administration expanded285
its pre-market drug approval process;  and a Congressional Office of286
Technology Assessment began studying and reporting on social and
environmental effects of emerging technologies.  The subject matter287
inquiry and the patent system as a whole, in contrast, showed little
awareness of technology’s risks.  The inquiry continues to promote288
indiscriminately innovation in the name of economic growth. With few
exceptions,  the patent law fails to acknowledge that financial incentives289
may be inappropriate for some technologies.
Patent advocates argue that this situation is appropriate, and that
regulatory agencies, not the PTO, are the proper forums for technology
assessment.  They note that a patent grants only negative rights to290
exclude others from practicing an invention,  and that in the case of many291
technologies, an inventor must still seek regulatory approval to use an
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292. See id. at 5.
293. The idea of regulating use rather than development of technology shows the lingering
influence of a 1967 policy decision of the National Academy of Science that concerns about
technology should be handled by regulating human behavior rather than regulating the production
of technologies. PURSELL, supra note 53, at 301–02, 308–09. In the case of unreasonably dangerous
and hazardous technologies, this policy raises serious questions of whether it is ever possible to
prohibit use of technologies once they have been developed.
294. See, e.g., Merges, supra note 68, at 1062; Benjamin D. Enerson, Protecting Society from
Patently Offensive Inventions: The Risk of Reviving the Moral Utility Doctrine, 89 CORNELL L.
REV. 685, 691 (2004).
295. See Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364, 1366–67 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
(discrediting the moral utility doctrine); see also Bagley, supra note 22, at 469–70. Some
commentators contend that the moral utility doctrine retains some force. See, e.g., Enerson, supra
note 294, at 691–92; Richard Guerra, Therapeutic Cloning as Proper Subject Matter for Patent
Eligibility, 43 IDEA 695, 709–13 (2003). They point to a PTO Office Action rejecting a patent
application claiming a process for creating a human-animal chimera in 2003, which noted that the
application “raise[d] grave issues going to the core of what a useful invention is.” See Image File
Wrapper, U.S. Patent App. No. 08/993,564 (filed Dec. 18, 1999), available at
http://portal.uspto.gov/external/portal/pair (enter application number 08/993,564, click “search,”
then click “Image File Wrapper,” then click 01-29-2003 “Non-Final Rejection” to view the rejected
patent application). The prevalent view, however, is that the doctrine no longer plays a role in
patent jurisprudence. 
296. See WINNER, supra note 137, at 6, 29. For example, television does not merely offer
entertainment and information. It expands markets, influences political thought, changes family and
other social relationships, and alters the ways in which people experience life. Chellis Glendinning,
Notes Toward a Neo-Luddite Manifesto, in PHILOSOPHY OF TECHNOLOGY: THE TECHNOLOGICAL
CONDITION, supra note 25, at 603, 604.
297.  Yaron Ezrahi, Technology and the Illusion of the Escape from Politics, in TECHNOLOGY,
PESSIMISM, AND POSTMODERNISM, supra note 52, at 29, 31–32 (“[A]ny technology, and indeed any
technical action, has a hidden ethical and political “software”; that the transparency of actions
captured within ends-means schemata conceals a multiplicity of normative choices that do not fully
invention.  Most emerging technologies, however, are not yet within the292
purview of a regulatory agency. More importantly, it is precisely because
the decision to grant a patent is distinct from the decision to allow use of
an invention that the patentable subject matter inquiry should account for
technology’s risks.293
Patent advocates will assert that moral and ethical concerns find no
place within the patent system; that the system must remain technology-
neutral; that it should promote all types of invention and innovation.294
They will point to the Federal Circuit’s 1998 repudiation of the moral
utility doctrine  and to the consensus among patent attorneys that social,295
political, and moral values find no place within the patentability analysis.
Technologies are not neutral tools, however, directed toward good or bad
only by their user.  Nor do they have an innate logic directing their296
development. Rather, they are the product of a web of social and political
forces, embedded with the values and goals of those who produce and
control them.  If technologies are not neutral, a system that incentivizes297
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lend themselves to technical or computational treatment. Advocates of science- or technology-
based democratic politics overlooked the fact that engineers do not just solve technical problems.
They also generate changes in the distribution of values and scarce material and political assets.”);
see also JASANOFF, supra note 183, at 4–6; WINNER, supra note 137, at 6, 29.
298. Additional examples include disease treatments and certain up-stream technologies.
Restricting the monopoly on classes of invention, or precluding patents outright, would impose a
substantial cost—elimination of the financial incentive for innovation and disclosure. In some
industries, such as biotechnology and pharmaceuticals, this cost may be an unacceptably high price
to pay for increased access because it will dramatically decrease invention. See H. Jeffrey
Lawrence, The High Cost of Prescription Drugs: the Price of Success?, 4 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y
L. & ETHICS 165, 169–71 (2004); Edwin Mansfield, Patents and Innovation: An Empirical Study,
32 MGMT. SCI. 173, 173–80 (1986) (surveying twelve industries and 100 firms and finding that
patents were much more important in the chemical and pharmaceutical industries). In other
industries, however, such a restriction may ultimately maximize social welfare.
299. John Thomas notes that, “[a]s we read with amusement patent instruments claiming
methods for swinging a golf club, treating cancer or administering a mortgage, we come to realize
that the patent law seems poised to embrace the broadest reaches of human experience.” Thomas,
Liberal Professions, supra note 22, at 1139 (footnotes omitted). 
300. An expansive body of literature addresses commodification of the human body and
human identity. In a seminal article, Margaret Jane Radin argues that that which is
personal—connected to development and flourishing of people—is not and should not be treated
as fungible. Personal goods include goods involving personal communication and bodily integrity,
both of which are implicated by many recent inventions. Margaret Jane Radin, Market-
Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1903–09 (1987); see also Demaine & Fellmeth, supra note
22, at 443–44 (discussing the opponents’ argument for patenting the human genome as patenting
“something larger than personal property”); Eileen M. Kane, Splitting the Gene: DNA Patents and
the Genetic Code, 71 TENN. L. REV. 707, 725–26 (2004) (criticizing the valuation occurring by
patenting biological materials); Ong, supra note 290, at 5 (examining whether organic inventions
should qualify as patenable); Margaret Jane Radin, A Comment on Information Propertization and
them cannot be neutral. The patent system should acknowledge these
realities.
Just as the subject matter inquiry fails to acknowledge the risks of
emerging technologies, it also neglects the risks of widespread
patentability. The patent mechanism functions by restricting access to new
inventions on the belief that decreased access is a worthwhile price for
increased innovation. In the case of highly beneficial inventions, this
conclusion is not necessarily justified. Some technologies, such as life-
saving medications, may be so socially desirable or beneficial that it is
questionable whether one individual or group should be allowed to hold
exclusionary rights.  The current subject matter inquiry offers no298
mechanism for even considering this issue.
Moreover, the current inquiry is facilitating the expansion of patent
rights into all aspects of human activity and identity, raising new questions
about the creation of new classes of property rights.  Scholars have noted299
the ethical and moral implications of patents on the human body and other
forms of life. These issues include the problems of commodification of
that which is human and personal,  denigration of human dignity,  and300 301
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its Legal Milieu, 54 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 23, 23 (2006) (arguing that propertization is bound by other
concerns); Margaret Jane Radin, Cloning and Commodification, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 1123, 1123
(2002) (discussing commodification, commercialization, and the regulation of cloning).
301. Maureen L. Condic & Samuel B. Condic, The Appropriate Limits of Science in the
Formation of Public Policy, 17 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 157, 159–60 (2003).
302. Thomas, Future of Patent Law, supra note 22, at 581–82 (exploring the implications of
patenting abortion, law, and speech acts, and noting that “[n]ow that our patent system has engaged
virtually every human endeavor, it is time to recognize that patents . . . present the possibility of
impinging upon personal liberties long associated with core social values”). 
303. Marx, supra note 52, at 24.
304. Occasionally, awareness and concern for broader social values arise and are considered,
such as the PTOs mention of the moral utility doctrine in rejecting a patent application on a process
for creating a human-animal chimera. See supra note 295 and accompanying text.
305. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 223–24 (2003) (describing patent quid pro quo);
Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966) (noting the benefits for both a patent grantee and the
public).
306. Langdon Winner describes returning to a view of technology as a means to an end “a
supremely important step.” LANGDON WINNER, AUTONOMOUS TECHNOLOGY: TECHNICS-OUT-
OF-CONTROL AS A THEME IN POLITICAL THOUGHT 327 (1977) (explaining that technology is a
“means that, like all other means available to us, must only be employed with a fully informed
sense of what is appropriate. Here, the ancients knew, was the meeting point at which ethics,
politics, and technics came together.”).
307. Legislative solutions always pose the potential problem of interest group capture—no less
interference with core personal liberties.  Meanwhile, in a culture in302
which information constitutes capital and creates power,  patents on303
information technologies create and exacerbate wealth and power
inequalities. The current subject matter inquiry fails to recognize these
potential problems.304
As long as technology is defined exclusively in terms of economic
value-creation, there will be little incentive to address these problems.
Innovators will continue to seek patent rights, the PTO will continue to
grant them, and courts will continue to uphold them. The patent system as
an institution will not recognize its role in the health, safety, and
environmental problems of modern technology, or its potential role in
creating solutions. Costs that cannot be monetarily quantified will continue
to be ignored, and the patent system will serve the economic good, but not
necessarily the social good, broadly defined.
A broad conception of social good, however, is the ultimate
justification for the patent system’s imposition of limited monopolies.305
Social good should therefore be at the forefront of the patent system’s
conception of technology. In recognition of this ideal, the patent system’s
vision of technology should be re-envisioned as a means to the end of
social good,  and a new subject matter inquiry should be crafted306
accordingly. To ensure that the inquiry reflects society’s understanding of
technology and of the social good that technology serves, it should be
crafted through a political process, with debate in the public arena.  The307
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so in the case of patent law than other areas of law. See, e.g., Mark D. Janis, Patent Law in the Age
of the Invisible Supreme Court, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 387, 398–99. This concern is not a reason to
avoid a legislative solution, however, particularly when Congress is the branch of government
charged with the task of creating a patent system to “promote . . . Progress of . . . useful Arts,” U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8, and the Supreme Court has repeatedly indicated its belief that Congress is
the actor competent to delineate the proper scope of patentable subject matter. See Lauren Cirlin,
Human or Animal: A Resolution to the Biotechnological Blurring of the Lines, 32 SW. U. L. REV.
501, 519 (2003). Moreover, the scope of patent rights in many areas of technology are of sufficient
interest and immediacy to the public that with information and education, public involvement may
mitigate the interest group issue. See Bagley, supra note 22, at 533 (“[A] decision to ban patents
on humans, for example, would implicate ideological concerns that, if the public were sufficiently
aroused, could overcome interest group capture to some extent, or at least focus it on the contours
of the ban, versus on the ban itself.”).
308. See Bagley, supra note 22, at 533.
309. The Supreme Court has repeatedly expressed unease at the prospect of addressing these
issues. See, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 317 (1980) (“The choice we are urged to
make is a matter of high policy for resolution within the legislative process after the kind of
investigation, examination, and study that legislative bodies can provide and courts cannot.”);
Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 595 (1978) (“Difficult questions of policy concerning the kinds of
programs that may be appropriate for patent protection and the form and duration of such protection
can be answered by Congress on the basis of current empirical data not equally available to this
tribunal.” (footnote omitted)); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 73 (1972) (“If these programs
are to be patentable, considerable problems are raised which only committees of Congress can
manage, for broad powers of investigation are needed, including hearings which canvass the wide
variety of views which those operating in this field entertain.” (footnote omitted)). 
310. 42 U.S.C. § 2181(a) (2000). Currently, Congress is considering similar legislation
addressing tax methods. See H.R. 2365, 110th Cong. (2007).
311. See Bagley, supra note 22, at 469–70 (urging a return to the moral utility doctrine); John
Thomas, The Post-Industrial Patent System, 10 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 3, 53
(1999) (urging adoption of an “industrial application standard”). International examples exist for
this course of action. Notwithstanding a general prohibition against discriminating between fields
of technology in granting patent rights, the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPs) provides that “[m]embers may exclude from patentability
inventions . . . [where] necessary to protect order public or morality, including to protect human,
animal or plant life or health” as an exception. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, art. 27, Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 81. This
provision recognizes that many countries’ patent laws include a morality component to
value, meaning, and future course of technology are deeply social,
political, and moral issues,  not always appropriate for judicial308
resolution.309
Legislation expressing a new vision of technology could take many
forms. It could be specific, addressing particular areas of non-patentable
subject matter. This approach has been used by Congress in the past,
precluding patents for nuclear weapons and related technology.310
Alternatively, legislation could entail a general re-codification of the
subject matter requirement with a role for consideration of society’s
interest. For example, a new morality-based exclusion, similar to the moral
utility doctrine, could be enacted.  Or a public objection period could be311
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patentability. The European Patent Convention, for example, contains an express morality-based
exclusion, which not only allows patent examiners to reject a patent application, but allows
members of the public to oppose the patent grant at any time within nine months of the decision
to grant the patent. Article 53 states: “European patents shall not be granted in respect of: (a)
inventions the publication or exploitation of which would be contrary to ‘ordre public’ or
morality . . . .” European Patent Convention art. 53(a), Jan. 11, 1978, 1065 U.N.T.S. 199, 272. The
Japanese patent law similarly provides that “inventions liable to contravene public order, morality
or public health shall not be patented.” Shôhô [Japanese Patent Law], Law No. 121 of 1959,
amended by Law No. 220 of 1999, art. 32, translated in World Intellectual Property Organization,
Collection of Laws for Electronic Access, http://www.wipo.int/clea/docs_new/en/jp/jp036en.html.
312. For a proposal for a post-grant opposition system in the United States, see Arti Rai,
Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach to Patent System Reform, 103 COLUM.
L. REV. 1035, 1077 (2003). Creating a process for public involvement in the patenting process
would more closely align patent grants with public perception of technology’s benefits, risks, and
meaning in society. 
313. Under the Clean Air Act, certain inventions to control air pollution are subject to
compulsory licenses, 42 U.S.C. § 7608 (2000), and under the Atomic Energy Act, certain
inventions relating to atomic energy are subject to licenses as well. 42 U.S.C. § 2183 (2000). Also,
the Bayh-Doyle Act grants a funding agency “march-in rights” to compel licenses in certain
circumstances. 35 U.S.C. § 203 (2000). 
314. The Medical Activity Act bars patent enforcement actions against medical practitioners.
35 U.S.C. § 287(b)(4)(C) (2000).
315. But see, e.g., Kane, supra note 22, at 523 (referring to the subject matter requirement as
the “least vital doctrine in the set of statutory requirements for patentability”); Jeffrey Kuhn,
Patentable Subject Matter Matters: New Uses for an Old Doctrine, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 89,
89 (2007) (“Decades of subject matter expansion by the United States Patent and Trademark Office
(USPTO) and Federal Circuit with no restrictions imposed by Congress or the Supreme Court
created the impression that subject matter was effectively a dead doctrine.”).
instituted, similar to the European Patent Convention’s post-grant
objection period.  Finally, legislation could continue broad subject matter312
standards, but tailor use of the right or enforcement based on the
underlying technology. For example, some inventions are subject to
compulsory licensing,  and medical procedure patents are currently313
unenforceable against doctors and other medical practitioners.  314
Discussing and crafting the patent system’s vision of technology within
the public sphere will raise awareness among legislators, judges, scholars,
and the public of the subject matter inquiry’s critical role within the patent
system, and its critical impact on society. Despite the patentable subject
matter inquiry’s expansive scope and lenient standards in recent years, the
inquiry is not obsolete.  Rather, it is a requirement with deep significance315
for the patent system as a whole. The subject matter inquiry is the patent
system’s expression of the definition, meaning, and role of technology in
society. If the inquiry is not crafted with care, it will continue to preclude
consideration of non-quantifiable costs while extending the patent
system’s reach into all corners of human activity. Commodification of all
aspects of human existence will be a foregone conclusion, and the patent
system, though creating economic value, will fail to serve the social good.
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316. WINNER, supra note 137, at 6.
V.  CONCLUSION
From the patent system’s inception to the present, the subject matter
inquiry’s vision of technology has changed dramatically. The early
inquiry, rooted in an Enlightenment vision, accounted for a broad array of
values and defined technology as the control of nature for broad social
benefit. The twentieth century inquiry, rooted in a Modern vision,
accounted only for economic value and defined technology as a means to
the assured end of economic growth. The current inquiry, representing the
culmination of the Modern vision, has surrendered control over the
definition of technology to economic forces, and embraced a sense of
technological determinism. Technology has become any product of human
action that creates economic value. And the patent law has become a
technology itself, capable of methodical application to achieve economic
progress. 
If the patent law is a technology, however, it is a social
technology—the product of a web of social and political interests.  And316
if the patent system currently embraces a vision of technological
determinism, the system only does so because, over time, we have shaped
the inquiry to empower that vision. Through a political process, we can
reshape the inquiry and empower it with a different vision—one that more
closely tracks society’s conception of the social good.
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